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ARTICLE

CIVIL RIGHTS CONUNDRUM
Carl Tobias*
PROLOGUE: ROBESON COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA

The Native Americans and African Americans comprising nearly
two-thirds of the residents in Robeson County, North Carolina
have experienced racism for all of their lives. 1 Interstate 95, a major route for drug traffickers, intersects this poor rural county. According to court documents, many residents believe that some local
law enforcement officials participate in the substantial drug trade
there. 2
William Webb, a former Assistant United States Attorney, re* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Hesse, Sally Johnson,
and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Beverly Stevenson for
processing this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Any errors that
remain are mine.
1
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on Behalf of Lewis Pitts at 2, In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d
505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991) (No. 90-807) [hereinafter Pitts
Petition].
2
See Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 2-3 (discussing "general climate of fear" among
Robeson residents due to drug trafficking and noting law enforcement officials' involvement
in drug trade).
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cently led a joint investigation by the United States Attorney for
the Eastern District of North Carolina and the North Carolina
State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) into cocaine trafficking in eastern North Carolina. 3 In February 1987, Mr. Webb informed the
Raleigh News and Observer that Robeson County was "one of the
largest areas for cocaine sales I've seen."4 One year later, Webb
told the Raleigh newspaper that there had been no change: "It's
true-Robeson County is awash in cocafo.e." 5
On February 1, 1988, Eddie Hatcher and Timothy Jacobs, two
members of the Tuscarora Tribe, staged an armed takeover in the
offices of The Robesonian, a newspaper published in Robeson
County. 6 Hatcher and Jacobs held twenty hostages for ten hours,
in order, they said, to protest and to publicize their previously ignored charges of widespread corruption and criminal conduct in
local government. This alleged government wrongdoing particularly threatened the well-being of Native Americans and African
Americans living in Robeson County, because their lack of economic resources and of political power makes them especially vulnerable to the improper exercise of governmental authority. 7
The two men later specifically asserted that they intended the
takeover to serve as a forum for charging Robeson County Sheriff
Hubert Stone and the local District Attorney with corruption and
official misbehavior. 8 Hatcher and Jacobs said that they also acted
out of concern for their personal safety and that of a Native American inmate in the county jail who had given them information
that implicated the Sheriff's Department in activities involving il-

3
See Memorandum of Appellant Barry Nakell Responding More Completely to Ques·
tions at Oral Argument at 4 n.3, In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990) (No. 89-2815),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991) [hereinafter Memorandum of Nakell].
• Lee Freeland Hancock, Cocaine Trade Rich in Robeson, Officials Say, RALEIGH NEWS
AND OBSERVER, Feb. 9, 1987, at lA, 9A.
• Joe Dew & Jane Ruffin, Drug Money a Powerful Lure in Robeson, RALEIGH NEWS AND
OBSERVER, Feb. 14, 1988, at lA.
• In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991);
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on Behalf of William Kunstler at 1, Kunst/er (No. 90-802)
[hereinafter Kunstler Petition]; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 3, 7.
7
Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 510; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 3-5; Memorandum of Nakell,
supra note 3, at 3-5 & n.3; see, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 9-10 (providing examples
of improper governmental behavior toward these minorities).
8
Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 510; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 3-4; Kunstler Petition, supra
note 6, at 1; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on Behalf of Barry Nakell at 1, Kunst/er (No.
90-1094) [hereinafter Nakell Petition].
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licit drugs. 9 Hatcher and Jacobs explained that they sought to encourage North Carolina Governor James Martin to investigate
these alleged improprieties, including the Sheriff's possible participation in the illegal drug trade and his responsibility for the death
of an African American inmate who had died in the county jail
while in the Sheriff's custody. 10
The episode ended peacefully when the two men "surrendered to
federal authorities in exchange for a promise that a Governor's
Task Force would investigate their complaints" about the offices of
the District Attorney and the Sheriff and the SBI local and district
offices.11 Crucial to the hostage negotiations was the opportunity
that Hatcher and Jacobs had to surrender to federal, not state or
county, officers because the two men feared the county officials
who had been the focus of their charges. 12 Hatcher and Jacobs believed that there was an agreement between the Governor, the
North Carolina Attorney General, the United States Attorney, and
the Sheriff that federal, rather than state, authorities would prosecute the two men. 13
The armed takeover of the newspaper office in February 1988
triggered many developments, which have not yet run their course.
This brief description of that event, however, narrates this story
nearer its conclusion than its beginning. The tale actually has its
origins in developments that began in the mid-1970s. Those developments led to changes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 prescribing the imposition of sanctions against litigants and lawyers
who fail to conduct reasonable legal and factual inquiries before

• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 3-5; Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3, at 5.
10
Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 3-4; Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3, at 4 n.3;
Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 1.
11
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 510-11; Consolidated Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writs of
Certiorari on Behalf of William Kunstler, Barry Nakell and Lewis Pitts at 3, Kunstler
[hereinafter Consolidated Brief]; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 3; Kunstler Petition, supra
note 6, at 1; Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 1.
12
Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 3; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 1-2; Memorandum
of Nakell, supra note 3, at 5-6.
13
Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2; see also Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 6-7
(noting petitioners' conclusion that prosecution was brought in "bad faith"). But see Consolidated Brief, supra note 11, at 3 (noting federal prosecutor's lack of knowledge about "no
state prosecution" agreement). The Governor arranged for federal, rather than state, prose·
cution, but he did not coordinate that arrangement with the Attorney General or the United
States Attorney. Letter from Barry Nakell, counsel for plaintiff Hatcher, to Carl Tobias
(June 18, 1992) (on file with author).
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filing suit or who pursue litigation for improper purposes. 14
Hatcher and Jacobs, and especially their attorneys, became very
familiar with the 1983 amendment of Rule 11.
I.
A.

THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION AND AMENDMENT OF RULE

11

THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION

In the mid-1970s, the federal judiciary, led by Chief Justice
Warren Burger, began to perceive that there was a litigation explosion in the federal courts. 16 Many judges and commentators
claimed that the number of federal civil lawsuits was increasing
substantially and that too many of these cases were meritless. 16
Some observers argued that specific kinds of litigation, particularly
civil rights cases, contributed significantly to expanding caseloads
and that a disproportionate number of the lawsuits lacked validity.17 Numerous judges and writers criticized the 1938 Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which permitted flexible pleading and
open-ended discovery while according litigants and attorneys substantial control over cases. 18 Some of these judges and commentators contended that the Rules allowed parties and lawyers to abuse
,. See infra notes 15-23 and accompanying text (discussing background and content of
Rule 11 amendment).
'" See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 287-96 (1989); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 740-41 (1975) (discussing concerns over potential for vexatious litigation); Warren E.
Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need For Systematic Anticipation, in THE POUND CON·
FERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 23 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler
eds., 1979) (discussing litigation explosion).
18
See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (expressing concern over
"heavy litigation burden" of civil suits on federal courts); Thomas B. Marvell, Caseload
Growth-Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 160 (1987) (concluding that civil filings in
federal courts doubled between 1976 and 1986). See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982) (describing trend toward greater judicial involvement in
pretrial aspects of cases to expedite increased caseload).
17
See, e.g., Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing
Negrich v. Hahn, 379 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1967), for proposition that civil rights cases are
disproportionately frivolous). But see id. at 927 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (stating that civil
rights cases are not disproportionately frivolous); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab,
The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 642-43 (1987) (finding that image of litigation explosion in civil rights area is overstated).
18
Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 433, 440-43 (1986) (chronicling problems caused by open-en·
ded pleading under 1938 Federal Rules); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dino·
saur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1984) (arguing that burden of litigation on
courts is caused by inefficient pretrial procedures).
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the process of litigation by using procedural devices for tactical
benefit. For instance, litigants and lawyers allegedly employed the
threat of protracted discovery or litigation to extract settlements
from their opponents.
B.

AMENDED RULE 11

Many of these ideas were controversial during the mid-1970s,
and a number remain so today. 19 It is nearly impossible, for example, to define, much less to quantify, litigation abuse. Judges and
writers encounter similar difficulties identifying what would constitute a litigation explosion and ascertaining whether courts actually
have experienced such a phenomenon. Despite these problems and
a dearth of relevant data, the Advisory Committee on the Civil
Rules and the Supreme Court considered and then proposed major
changes in Federal Rules 11, 16, and 26 during the early 1980s.20
Because Congress did not oppose the Court's recommendations,
the revised provisions became effective in August 1983.21
The drafters of the amendments intended to transform the nature of federal civil lawsuits. 22 The revisions assigned litigants and

1
• See Tobias, supra note 15, at 288-89 {citing pertinent literature and discussing efforts
to resolve some of controversy); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF.
L. REv. 485, 522-23 (1988·89) {same). Compare Miller, supra note 18 (presenting case for
existence of litigation explosion) with Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or,
the Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 921 {chnllenging idea that

there has been litigation explosion).
20
See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Ex·
ample of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1927-28 (1989) {noting Advisory Committee's lack
of data concerning application of Rule 11); Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2197, 2198-202 (1989) (same).
The Advisory Committee is comprised of judges, law professors, and practicing attorneys.
Congress has charged the Committee with responsibility for studying the Rules and developing proposals for change as indicated. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2071-2074 (West. 1982 & Supp.
1991}. See generally Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and
its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 l\1Ica L. REv. 1507, 1509-11 (1987) (surveying distribution of responsibility for rulemaking shared between Congress and Supreme Court).
21
See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983)
(amending, inter alia, Federal Rules 11, 16, and 26). See generally ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE
1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE
MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPoNsmILITY {Federal Judicial Center 1984) (discussing backgroilnd and objectives of amendments).
22
See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1011-13 (1st
Cir. 1988) {discussing effects drafters intended 1983 amendments to have on pretrial phase
of litigation); MILLER, supra note 21, at 9-10 {discussing "themes," or goals, of various
amendments}; Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.BA J.
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attorneys important, novel responsibilities, requiring, for instance,
that they conduct reasonable inquiries before filing pleadings or
certain discovery requests. The changes also enhanced trial courts'
discretion and their control over litigation, especially during its
pretrial phase, allowing judges, for example, to set the pace of discovery. Amended Rule 11 required judges to sanction parties or
lawyers who do not perform reasonable inquiries before they submit papers or who tender them for improper purposes. 23
C.

JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE AMENDED RULE

From the time that revised Rule 11 became effective in August
1983 until 1988, the federal judiciary applied the Rule's provisions

in ways that disadvantaged many civil rights plaintiffs and their
attorneys. 24 Rule 11 sanctions were sought from, and granted
against, these plaintiffs more frequently than any other type of
federal civil litigant. 26 Many courts vigorously enforced the Rule's
prefiling inquiry requirements against civil rights plaintiffs, 26 and
1648, 1650-52 (1981) (criticizing proposal that became 1983 amendment as substantial de·
parture from original Rules).
•• Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer
that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best
of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable in·
quiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose . . . . If a pleading, motion,
or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre·
sented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses in·
curred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. C1v. P. 11.
•• Carl Tobias, Reassessing Rule 11 and Civil Rights Cases, 33 How. L.J. 161, 163 (1990);
Tobias, supra note 19, at 490-507; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118
F.R.D. 189 (1988); cf. Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation:
A Golden Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1023, 1052-61 (1989) (providing
positive view of Rule ll's efficacy).
•• See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 11-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1327,
1340 (1986) (noting disproportionate number of civil rights cases in which Rule 11 sanctions
are applied); Vairo, supra note 24, at 200-01 (same).
•• See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1080-85 (7th Cir.
1987) (remanding case for more "serious" inquiry into Rule 11 violations), cert. dismissed,
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some judges imposed onerous sanctions on plaintiffs who contravened the provision.27 A significant number of courts inconsistently
applied Rule 11 to similar factual circumstances or inconsistently
interpreted the provision's phraseology, and there was much expensive satellite litigation principally involving the Rule's meaning.28 This implementation disadvantaged, and perhaps disproportionately affected, civil rights plaintiffs and their counsel. Many
civil rights litigants and practitioners have limited resources, a
consideration that can make them risk-averse.20 These developments discouraged the parties and attorneys.30
In early 1988, around the time when Eddie Hatcher and
Timothy Jacobs occupied The Robesonian newspaper offices, for-

485 U.S. 901 (1988); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985)
(upholding imposition of sanctions for inadequate prefiling inquiry although important facts
apparently were available to plaintiff only upon discovery).
27 See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (imposing more than $1
million in sanctions), aff'd, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913
(1992); Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1384-93 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (imposing $84,000 sanction), vacated in part on reconsideration, 123 F.R.D. 204 (E.D.N.C. 1988), affd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991).
28 See, e.g., Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192, 1200 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting
division among courts and writers over whether Rule 11 imposes "continuing duty" on attorneys); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.) (showing district and circuit judges retained three different views of appropriate amount of sanctions
even after issuing five opinions), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); see Burbank, supra note
20, at 1930 ("[T]here is a conflict between or among circuits on practically every important
question of interpretation or policy under the Rule ••••"); Tobias, supra note 19, at 514
(recognizing problem of satellite litigation, litigation unrelated to merits of dispute).
•• See Tobias, supra note 19, at 495-98 (describing heightened risk of sanctions placed on
civil rights practitioners and litigants and noting that lack of resources makes it difficult to
overcome intrinsic problems in meeting Rule 11 requirements). See generally Barry Boyer
& Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Ci ti·
zen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 923-35 (1985) (discussing litigation costs and incentives in citizen suits for environmental regulation and resource
deficiencies of plaintiffs); John L. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Im·
plications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Deriva·
tive Actions, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 669 (1986) (discussing costs and incentives to litigate in class
and derivative actions).
30
See Tobias, supra note 19, at 503-06 (noting evidence of "chilling effects" of Rule 11 on
civil rights litigation); Tobias, supra note 24, at 169-70 (same). These contentions are, however, controversial. See Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 344, 345 (1990) [hereinafter Call for Comments]
(seeking opinions of members of bar to discuss possible "chilling ell'ect" of sanctions because
controversial).
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mal judicial application of Rule 11 in civil rights cases began to
improve. 31 A substantial number of appellate and district court
judges enforced the provision in ways that were more responsive to
the needs of civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers. 32
The national developments between August 1983 and early 1988
were similar to those in the Fourth Circuit, although that appellate
court evinced greater concern for civil rights plaintiffs in enunciating a Rule 11 jurisprudence. The Fourth Circuit issued considerably fewer Rule 11 opinions than other appellate courts, such as the
Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. 33 Those circuits are responsible for reviewing appeals from district courts that have experienced intensive Rule 11 activity, such as the Southern District of
New York, the Northern District of Illinois, and the Northern District of California. 34 By contrast, no judges who are members of the
Fourth Circuit showed the type of enthusiasm for the Rule exhibited by several Seventh Circuit judges, who proclaimed their intention to enforce Rule 11 to the hilt. 35 •
The Fourth Circuit expressed particular concern about the imposition of large sanctions. For example, in one civil rights case, a
panel of the court held that parties who win Rule 11 motions are
31
See Tobias, supra note 24, at 166-71 (discussing judicial application of Rule 11 since
mid-1988); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 Recalibrated in Civil Rights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105,
110-22 (1991) (discussing improvements in judicial use of Rule 11).
32
See, e.g., Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1988) (reversing imposition of sanctions
and recognizing chilling effect on civil rights cases); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d
866 (5th Cir. 1988) (providing guidelines for imposing Rule 11 sanctions and recognizing
possibility of chilling effect); see infra notes 122-140 and accompanying text (discussing judicial development of Rule 11 application between 1988 and 1990). See generally Tobias,
supra note 24, at 166-71; Tobias supra note 31, at 110-22 (noting recent judicial concern
about imposing sanctions in civil rights cases).
•• A LEXIS search revealed that the Fourth Circuit issued approximately 30 Rule 11
opinions between August 1983 and December 31, 1987. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit issued as many as 70 opinions in one year during that period.
•• See Vairo, supra note 24, at 200 (stating that between August 1983 and December 15,
1987, nearly one-third of reported cases arose out of districts including New York City and
Chicago); Nelken, supra note 25, at 1326-28 (stating that "one-half of the Rule 11 opinions
in the first two years came from [New York and Chicago]"); cf. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR.,
FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES § lD, at 1-2 (1991) [hereinafter FJC REPORT] (noting that between 1984 and
1989, district courts in Northern District of Illinois and Southern District of New York issued 38% of reported opinions).
•• Dreis & Krump Mfg. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist.
No. 8, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 1986); accord Szabo Food Serv. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d
1073, 1082 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
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not "automatically entitled" to attorney's fees and that trial judges
should choose the "least severe" sanction that serves the Rule's
purpose.36 Another Fourth Circuit panel observed that in the Rule
11 context reasonable attorney's fees need not be those actually
incurred.37 Few district judges in the Fourth Circuit applied the
provision's reasonable prefiling inquiry requirement vigorously
against civil rights plaintiffs. This Rule 11 jurisprudence, especially
the relative infrequency with which sanctions motions are filed,
may reflect the gentility prevalent in the region and in the local
legal culture. 38

II.
A.

ROBESON COUNTY REVISITED

FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

Soon after Hatcher and Jacobs surrendered on February 1, 1988,
the federal grand jury for the Eastern District of North Carolina
returned indictments, which included weapons and hostage-taking
charges, against the two men.39 The Robeson County District Attorney, Joe Freeman Britt, then dismissed state kidnapping
charges against Hatcher and Jacobs, apparently because the federal authorities had preempted those charges;' 0
In September 1988, the three-week criminal trial of Hatcher and
Jacobs in federal court began. On October 14, 1988, a federal jury
acquitted the two men of all federal criminal charges involving the
takeover. 41 The defendants claimed that their need for self-protection and for a forum in which to expose corruption in local government justified the takeover. William Kunstler, a nationally recog-

u Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987). The panel did, however, find that
there was a Rule 11 violation, admonishing the district judge to impose a sanction that
would "serve the essential goal of education and deterrence underlying Rule 11." Id. at 467.
37
Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm Partnership, 850 F.2d 207, 211 (4th Cir. 1988).
"" For instance, judges of the Fourth Circuit always shake the hands of lawyers at the
conclusion of oral argument. The absence of any large cities, such as New York, where there
typically is more litigation abuse and members of the bar are relatively unlikely to know one
another, may afford a partial explanation for the Rule 11 jurisprudence. See generally Lawrence C. Marshall, et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REY. 943 (1992)
(discussing federal court legal culture); Carl Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11,
33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 429 (1992) (same).
. •• In re Kunstler,·914 F.2d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991);
Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 4.
•• Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2.
41
Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 4.
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nized civil rights advocate, and Barry Nakell, a professor at the
University of North Carolina School of Law, represented
Hatcher. 42 Jacobs's attorney was Lewis Pitts, Director of the Christie Institute South, a public interest law firm in Carrboro, North
Carolina. 43 Hatcher and Jacobs presented a joint defense, although
the lawyers represented them separately.44
The Charlotte Observer published an editorial following the acquittal that stated:
Obviously the allegations that Mr. Hatcher and Mr. Jacobs made about conditions in their county were not only
credible, but persuasive enough to convince the jury that
they acted without criminal intent . . . . And jurors
reached that conclusion without some of the most damaging testimony about the criminal justice system [by]
Maurice Geiger, a lawyer and co-director of the Rural
Justice Center . . . . He said there were pervasive local
assertions that law enforcement officers are involved in
drug dealing . . . . There are simply too many rumors
and assertions of corruption and injustice there for state
and federal officials to ignore. 46
B.

ROBESON COUNTY AFTER ACQUITTAL

Eddie Hatcher returned to Robeson County after his acquittal
and, according to court papers, participated actively in political efforts to prevent discrimination against Native Americans and African Americans, to expose the alleged official misconduct in the
county, and to promote constructive change. 46 Hatcher and the
Robeson Defense Committee, an organization formed to protect
and promote the interests of Native Americans and African Americans, sponsored public meetings and began a campaign to remove
from office both Sheriff Hubert Stone and his son, Deputy Sheriff

•• Id.
•• Id.; Consolidated Brief, supra note 11, at 3-4.
0
Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 4.
•• Verdict Indicts Robeson-Shocking Decision Challenges Gov. Martin, Other Officials,
CHARLOTIE OBSERVER, Oct. 17, 1988, at Al7, reprinted in Memorandum of Nakell, supra
note 3, at 4-5 n.3.
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 4-5; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2; accord Consolidated Brief, supra note 11, at 4.
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Kevin Stone.47
The petition drive to oust the Sheriff initially enjoyed considerable success.48 According to some sources, certain officials of the
SBI, the Sheriff's office, and the District Attorney's office began to
speak publicly and behave in ways that interfered with the campaign, intimidated its potential supporters, and suppressed opposing political discussion.49 In November 1988, newspaper accounts
reported that the SBI and the District Attorney had revived and
broadened their investigation into the takeover. This new investigation included possible conspiracy charges against persons other
than Hatcher and Jacobs who may have been involved. 110 SBI
agents questioned Native Americans, African Americans, and
others connected with the Robeson Defense Committee about their
political activities and those of attorney Bob Warren and sought
membership lists for the Tuscarora Tribe.111 The Sheriff's Department allegedly pressured public school officials to prevent the
Committee from using educational facilities for meetings. 112
Hatcher and other citizens of the county informed Lewis Pitts
and Barry Nakell that these activities were intimidating residents.
The two laWYers claimed that they sought confirmation of the accounts in conversations with Robeson County public school officials, a tribal chief, and a security officer at a local state college.113
In November and December, Nakell wrote two letters to the North
Carolina Attorney General detailing the behavior of the SBI, the
District Attorney, and the Sheriff, asking the Attorney General to

" Pitts Petition, supra note l, at 5; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2; Nakell Petition,
supra note 8, at 1-2.
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 5.
•• In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991);
Pitts Petition, supra note l, at 5-6; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2; Nakell Petition,
supra note 8, at 1-3.
60
Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 6; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2; accord Consolidated Brief, supra note 11, at 5. "In fact, this 'investigation' appeared to be a sham as the
possibility of conspiracy had already been thoroughly investigated and discarded as part of
the Federal prosecution." Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 6-7. Warren was co-counsel with
Lewis Pitts in the federal trial.
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 7; Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 2-3.
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 7. This exclusion was contrary to school policy. Id. But
see Consolidated Brief, supra note 11, at 6 (mentioning nothing about exclusion but explaining that sheriff's department was not responsible for providing security for meetings at
school).
03
,
Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 7-8.
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investigate and respond. 54 The Attorney General rejected these requests and claimed that the SBI was not participating in any
abuse of process. 55
C.

STATE PROSECUTION

After the North Carolina Attorney General rejected Nakell's requests, the District Attorney for Robeson County announced that
he intended to call a grand jury to bring the previously suspended
state charges against Hatcher and Jacobs. 116 Their lawyers, Nakell
and Pitts, informed the District Attorney and the Governor's counsel that state prosecution would contravene the agreement, reached
in ending the takeover, which provided only for federal criminal
prosecution. 57 Nonetheless, on December 6, 1988, a Robeson
County grand jury returned indictments against Hatcher and Jacobs for kidnapping. 58 Local authorities arrested Hatcher and released him on bond. Hatcher then fled to California, where state
authorities held him in custody pending extradition. Jacobs was
arrested in New York and unsuccessfully opposed extradition. 119
Later in December, agents of the SBI and of the District Attorney allegedly approached Jacobs's family without notifying Lewis
Pitts, his attorney. 6 ° Court papers state that the agents suggested
that Jacobs dismiss Pitts as his lawyer, "return voluntarily to
Robeson County, testify against Hatcher, and implicate others" involved in the alleged conspiracy to take over The Robesonian. 61
This interference troubled Jacobs, who was only twenty years old
at the time, and disrupted his relationship with counsel and the
joint defense with Hatcher. 62
Before and after the indictment, Pitts and Nakell claim that
they made numerous attempts to convince the Attorney General
•• Id. at 8; accord In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1607 (1991); Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 3-5.
•• Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2.
•• Id.; see also Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 5.
1
•
Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2; see also Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 4-5.
•• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 9; Kunstler Petition, supra
note 6, at 2; accord Consolidated Brief, supra note 11, at 6.
'
•• Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 5; accord Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Pitts Petition,
supra note 1, at 9.
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 9-10; Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 5-6.
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 10.
••Id.
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that the SBI and the District Attorney were intimidating residents
of the county, thus restricting their exercise of First Amendment
rights. 63 These persistent efforts proved unsuccessful, and a Deputy Attorney General informed Nakell in December to expect no
additional help from that office, because the Director of the SBI
had "closed the door. " 64
III.
A.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASE

FILING AND PURSUIT

Nakell and Pitts concluded that they should seek injunctive relief to protect the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel of Hatcher
and Jacobs and the First Amendment rights of the two men and of
other Robeson County residents. 611 In January 1989, the attorneys
researched relevant legal issues and conducted an additional factual investigation. They then circulated draft papers to numerous
laWYers, including one who had expertise in litigation involving
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, for their advice. 66 Nakell and Pitts briefly refrained from bringing suit, however, in an attempt to explore Jacobs's opportunities for a
favorable plea bargain. 67
On January 31, 1989, the eve of the first anniversary of The
Robesonian takeover, however, Nakell filed the civil rights com-plaint in the Eastern District of North Carolina, and Pitts held a
press conference announcing the litigation. 68 Nakell, Kunstler, and
Pitts filed an amended complaint on March 16, 1989.69 The plaintiffs were Hatcher, Jacobs, the Robeson Defense Committee, and
several Native-American and African-American residents of Robe-

63
Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 2; accord Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Nakell Petition,
supra note 8, at 4-6; see also supra text accompanying note 54 (describing attorneys'
efforts).
"' Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 11; accord Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 4-6.
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 12; accord Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Nakell Petition,
supra note 8, at 6-7.
•• Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 12; Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 7.
•• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 7-8.
•• "The Court of Appeals opinion erroneously said that Petitioner Nakell held the press
conference." Nakell Petition, supra note 8, at 8 n.5. The district court had not attributed to
Nakell any comments to the press. Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt, 132 F.R.D. 650, 654-55
(E.D.N.C. 1989), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 5-05
(4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991). Contra Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511.
•• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 12.

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

914

[Vol. 26:901

son County who were actively involved in the Committee.70 The
defendants included the Governor, the Robeson County District
Attorney and Sheriff, various members of their staffs, and numerous John Doe defendants.71
The complaint, filed pursuant to section 1983, alleged that the
defendants had violated the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments by participating in a campaign of intimidation and
harassment to suppress political dissent.72 Plaintiffs sought to enjoin interference with the relationship between Jacobs and his attorney, harassment of participants in the campaign to remove the
Sheriff, and the state prosecution of Hatcher and Jacobs, including
the extradition of Jacobs.73
The plaintiffs immediately moved for expedited discovery; however, the district judge stayed all discovery when the State requested a protective order alleging that the plaintiffs improperly
sought this information to use in the pending criminal proceeding.74 Plaintiffs submitted papers in opposition to the State's motion, but the trial court had not yet ruled on discovery when it
granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the case.711
B.

DISMISSAL

Many developments led Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts to reconsider their pursuit of the civil rights case.76 The attorneys said they
believed that the government's approaches to Jacobs through his
family undermined the relationship between Jacobs and Pitts and
between the two defendants. 77 Jacobs, having unsuccessfully opposed extradition, decided to return to Robeson County in late

1
° Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 12-13. Pitts represented Jn·
cobs and his mother; Kunstler and Nakell represented the remaining plaintiffs. Pitts Peti·
tion, supra note 1, at 13.
11
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 13. The plaintiffs sued the
Governor in his official capacity and all other defendants in their official and individual
capacities. Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511.
72
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 3.
73
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 14.
1
• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511-12; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 3; Pitts Petition,
supra note 1, at 14. The stay stalled the case and left the plaintiffs unable to advance it.
•• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 14.
76
These circumstances are fully described in Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 14-16;
Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 4.
77
Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 14-15.
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March 1989, secured local appointed counsel, and agreed to an independent plea bargain in April.78 Moreover, the attorneys thought
that the tactics of the SBI and the Sheriff's office had succeeded in
eroding the momentum of the petition drive to remove the Sheriff,
and the SBI apparently had ceased its conspiracy investigation of
other Robeson County residents. 79
Several factors prompted the three attorneys to withdraw the litigation. Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts believed that certain important
claims had been mooted; that those which remained could be vindicated in Hatcher's criminal prosecution, the defense of which
should be paramount; that the case was not moving because discovery had been blocked; and that pursuit of the damage claims
alone was not worthwhile. 80
On April 20, Nakell sought from a Deputy Attorney General the
defendants' approval of a stipulated dismissal with prejudice under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(l)(ii). 81 The Deputy rejected
the request; however, she authorized the plaintiffs to "state that
defendants did not object to a dismissal with prejudice under Rule
41(a)(2)."82 Nakell submitted a Rule 41(a)(2) motion, stating that
defendants' counsel "do not oppose this motion and do not object
to the Court granting it."83 The district court judge signed the motion and a proposed order dismissing the case on May 2.IH Neither
document included any conditions or terms reserving to the defendants the right to take additional action in the suit. ali In short,
the trial judge dismissed the case three months after the plaintiffs
filed it and prior to any hearings, discovery, or decisions on substantive motions.
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 15.
Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 15; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at. 4.
80
Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 15-16. "Subject to the provisions or Rule 23(e), of Rule
66, and of any statute of the United States, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
without order of court ..• (ii) by filing a stipulation or dismissal signed by all parties who
have appeared in the action." FEo. R. CIV. P. 4l(a)(l)(ii).
81
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 4.
~· Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; accord Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 16. "Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the
plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems proper." FEo. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2).
83
Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 4.
"' Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at. 4-5.
8
° Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 5. "Nor did the defendants mention, let. alone seek,
any such term or condition." Id.
78
79
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RULE 11 SANCTIONS

On June 13, the state defendants submitted a motion seeking
Rule 11 sanctions from Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts, and on July 5,
the county defendants filed a similar motion. 86 On August 8, the
plaintiffs' attorneys responded to these requests and moved for an
evidentiary hearing. On September 5, the lawyers sought Rule 11
sanctions against the defendants. 87 After neglecting to rule on the
request for an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge on September 8
heard oral argument exclusively on the question of whether Rule
11 had been violated. He instructed the litigants to submit additional material only upon request.88
On September 19, the court asked the state defendants for a
"short itemized statement in affidavit form showing time and expense incurred" in the litigation and on September 27 made a similar request of the county defendants. 89 On the same day, the
county defendants submitted the requested affidavit. The next
day, the trial judge signed his order granting sanctions of $92,834,
the exact amount that all counsel for defendants sought. 90 The
court levied additional punitive sanctions of $10,000 against each
of the plaintiffs' three lawyers for making baseless allegations
against public officials and seeking media attention. 91 The plaintiffs' attorneys did not receive the response until the judge had
signed the order, and they had no opportunity to contest the type
or size of the sanction. 92 According to Kunstler's later petition for
certiorari:
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 16. Governmental pursuit of
Rule 11 sanctions is somewhat unusual, at least at the federal level. See generally Tobias,
supra note 38, at 460-61.
87
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 5.
88
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512. "This was the first time the district court had met counsel."
Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 16.
89
Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3, at 7-8.
•• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3, at 8. "Indeed, the
Clerk actually entered the sanctions order in the docket sheet before it entered any of the
affidavits of counsel for the State Defendants . . . and never entered the affidavit of counsel
for the County Defendants." Id.
•• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 18.
•• Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3, at 8. "The Court's letter requesting the affidavits, the affidavits themselves, and the order arrived in their mail on the same day, Monday,
October 2, 1989." Id. The attorneys had no opportunity to assert that the sanctions should
be nonmonetary or, if monetary, what amount would be proper and whether equitable factors, such as their ability to pay, should apply. Id. at 8-9.
88
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Although the parties' affidavits presented sharply conflicting versions of critical facts, the court made its determinations, including evidentiary findings, solely on the
basis of the affidavits and other written materials, without listening to a word of testimony or permitting the
cross-examination of any affiant or the talcing of any deposition to help resolve factual con:flicts.93
D.

THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION

The trial judge commented at the outset of the opinion imposing
the sanctions that the court had "been inundated with written
materials" on Rule 11 issues and that the state and county "defendants ha[d] written 97 pages of memoranda, the plaintiffs 90."!H
The district judge preliminarily rejected the plaintiffs' contention
that the dismissal precluded the defendants from pursuing Rule 11
sanctions. 95 The court relied primarily on the idea that the "terms
and conditions that may be imposed upon a voluntary dismissal"
are for the defendants' protection; this protection is unnecessary
when the dismissal is with prejudice. 98
The judge then determined that plaintiffs' counsel had contravened all three prongs of Rule 11. First, the attorneys and parties
failed to perform reasonable legal inquiries to ensure that the filing
was in accord with current law or justified by a good faith argu:ment for a change in existing law.97 Second, they failed to conduct
reasonable factual investigations before filing papers.98 Finally,
they submitted the complaint for improper purposes.99 The court
treated the improper-purpose requirement before the other two
because the lawyers' motives and behavior troubled the judge.100
Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 5.
"' Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt, 132 F.R.D. 650, 652 & n.l (E.D.N.C. 1989), aff'd in
part and vacated in part sub nom. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991).
9
• Id. at 653.
""Id.
97
Id. at 656-59.
9
• Id.
09
Id. at 653-56.
100
Id. at 653-54.
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer
that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best
of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable in93
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The court found that the plaintiffs' attorneys never meant to litigate the lawsuit under section 1983. They had filed the case to
generate publicity, to embarrass county and state officials, to gain
leverage and secure discovery in the criminal prosecution, and to
intimidate individuals pursuing the prosecution. 101 The judge
based his determinations on inferences derived from several considerations: the fact that one attorney held a press conference
while another sent a copy of the complaint to the state court judge
who probably would have conducted the criminal trial, the ability
of the plaintiffs to obtain discovery otherwise unavailable, the litigation's timing, and, most important, counsel's "sudden and inexplicable" decision to dismiss the case with prejudice. 102
The court next stated that the complaint violated another requirement of Rule 11: it was not warranted by existing law. 103 The
judge initially observed that much, if not all, of the pleading failed
to "show that any plaintiff [was] entitled to any relief." 10" The
court considered what it characterized as several significant claims
to be lacking legal support. First, the judge rejected the plaintiffs'
claim based on the Double Jeopardy Clause because that clause
"does not prohibit subsequent prosecutions by different sovereigns. " 1011 Second, the court found unsubstantiated the assertion
that the State violated Hatcher's Fifth Amendment rights by attempting to extract testimony from Jacobs. The Amendment's
"protection is personal to the individual whose testimony is being
compelled and cannot protect Hatcher." 106 Third, the court decided that federal abstention doctrine clearly barred the plaintiffs'
request that state criminal proceedings be enjoined, rejecting the
quiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
FED. R. C1v. P. 11.
101
Robeson Defense Comm., 132 F.R.D. at 654-56.
102 Id.
103
Id. at 656-57.
10
' Id. at 656.
100
Id. The court cited Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985) (allowing sovereign states to
prosecute successively same crime due to independent authority), and rejected the plaintiffs'
"tool of the same authorities" exception premised on Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121
(1959), which argued that one sovereign was acting merely to facilitate the other's prosecution. Robeson Defense Comm., 132 F.R.D. at 656.
106
Robeson Defense Comm., 132 F.R.D. at 656-57.
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argument of exceptional circumstances.107 Fourth, the judge believed that many of the plaintiffs' claims posed serious standing
problems. 108
The court also found that the complaint was not well-grounded
in fact and, thus, contravened the third requirement of Rule 11.109
The judge declared that the plaintiffs had misstated several facts
to "implicate the defendants in a massive and sinister conspiracy. "110 The court specifically observed that, although a principal
allegation in the complaint was that the defendants reneged on an
agreement that government officials would not prosecute Hatcher
and Jacobs in state court, the officers lacked the authority to bind
the State in this manner.m Moreover, the court said that filing a
complaint and then participating in discovery "in 'anticipation'
that the complaint will prove warranted" violates Rule 11. 112 Furthermore, the judge found that the complaint was replete with serious allegations of criminal behavior and of malfeasance by highranking governmental officials and that many of these allegations
purportedly lacked factual substantiation or were irrelevant to the
litigation.113
The trial court, in selecting an appropriate sanction, proclaimed
that such sanctions' primary purpose is "to compensate the offended parties for all reasonable expenses" attributable to the Rule

107
See id. at 657. The court relied on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), to bar injunctive relief against criminal proceedings absent a showing of bad faith or lack or reasonable expectation of conviction and chided the plaintiffs for presenting "no cases appl)ing a
Younger exception which even remotely resembles this case." Robeson Defense Comm., 132
F.R.D. at 657.
108
The court relied on Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972), for the idea that "allegations of mere chill without any objective harm is [sic] not grounds for equitable relief."
Robeson Defense Comm., 132 F.R.D. at 657. The court chastised the plaintiffs for failing to
show a "specific, present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm." Id.
100
See Robeson Defense Comm., 132 F.R.D. at 657-58 (discussing factual inconsistencies
in plaintiffs' complaint).
0
"
Id. at 657.
m Id. The court criticized counsel for failing to consult the written agreement and the
transcript of the negotiations leading to release of the hostages, because nothing in those
materials suggested any promise not to prosecute. Id.
2
"
Id. at 658.
113
Id. The plaintiffs' counsel sharply contested some arguments that the court called allegations, such as the charge that the Sheriff was engaged in drug trafficking, and strongly
argued for the relevance of other facts that the court found irrelevant, such as the death or
an African-American inmate while in the Sheriff's custody. See id. (discussing plaintiffs'
allegations).
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11 violation. 114 The judge thus held the three lawyers jointly and

severally liable for all attorneys' fees and expenses that defendants
incurred: $92,834. 115 The court also levied "punitive sanctions" of
$10,000 on each lawyer based on findings that the Rule 11 violations were egregious and that the attorneys had intentionally filed
outrageous claims and publicized the allegations against high-ranking officials. 116
The district judge remarked that he had not imposed sanctions
lightly. He stated that civil rights lawyers have been instrumental
in promoting many societal goals and that "Mr. Kunstler has been
a leading civil rights attorney for many years." 117 The court held
that Rule 11, nevertheless, must apply to all practitioners, observing that the decision "in no way will deter civil rights lawyers from
filing legitimate complaints in the future to protect the civil rights
of others and the Constitution that we all hold so dear." 118
Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts appealed the district court's decision.119 The North Carolina Civil Liberties Union, the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, the North Carolina Association of
Black Lawyers, and the North Carolina Chapter of the National
Lawyers Guild filed amicus briefs essentially supporting the appellants' views. 120 The Washington Legal Foundation, on behalf of itself, Senator Jesse Helms, Representatives Howard Coble and Alex
McMillan, and the Allied Educational Foundation, submitted amicus briefs supporting the lower court decision and favoring the defendants' views. 121 Oral argument occurred on June 5, 1990, but
the Fourth Circuit did not issue an opinion until September. Between the time Hatcher and Jacobs broke into The Robesonian offices and the appellate court published its determination, there
were many Rule 11 developments that sharply contrasted with the
district court's decision.

Id. at 659.
Id. at 659-60.
116
Id. at 660. The court also barred counsel from practicing before it until they paid the
sanctions. Id.
111
Id. at 659.
116 Id.
11
• Morton Stavis of the Center for Constitutional Rights represented all three attorneys.
In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991).
120
See id. (identifying amici curiae for appellants).
121
See id. (identifying amici curiae for appellees).
114

116
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1988 UNTIL SEPTEllmER
1990
Beginning in 1988 and continuing through September 1990,
many courts rendered Rule 11 decisions favorable to civil rights
plaintiffs and practitioners.122 Nearly all of the circuit courts published opinions that recognized the needs of civil rights plaintiffs.
For instance, some appellate judges expressed concern that excessively vigorous implementation of the Rule could chill the litigants'
enthusiasm or undermine zealous advocacy. 123 A few circuit courts
treated the limited time that practitioners have to conduct reasonable prefiling inquiries as a significant factor in deciding whether
civil rights attorneys had contravened Rule 11.12' Appellate judges
also exhibited concern for civil rights plaintiffs when considering
the kinds of sanctions imposed. Many courts suggested that district judges seriously consider nonmonetary assessments or the violators' ability to pay when calculating pecuniary awards. m Trial
courts similarly improved their formal enforcement of the Rule in
civil rights cases. Some district judges refused to find that pro se
plaintiffs or plaintiffs who were litigating cases that appeared weak
had contravened Rule 11.128 Some trial courts were reluctant to
RULE

11

921

DEVELOPMENTS FROM EARLY

122
See Tobias, supra note 24, at 166·71 (citing primary sources); Tobias, supra note 31,
at 110·16 (same).
12
• See Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Rule 11
advisory committee notes to 1983 amendment); accord Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870
F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that sanctions could chill facially meritless and weak
but viable claims); Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84, 92 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that chilling effect
is not purpose of Rule 11).
m See Jenkins v. Missouri, 904 F.2d 415, 421 (8th Cir.) (stating that time for inquiry was
limited by approaching school term), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 346 (1990); Gillette v. Delmore,
886 F.2d 1194, 1199·1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that attorney was retained shortly before
statute of limitations had run); accord Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 467 (4th Cir. 1987)
(Butzner, J., dissenting) (noting that filing of complaint to meet statute of limitations made
extensive inquiry impracticable).
12
• See, e.g., Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (suggesting
use of ability·to·pay standard); Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholdezs, 857
F.2d 191, 195·97 (3d Cir. 1988) (recommending ability to pay as one of mitigating factors
court should consider); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs. 836 F.2d 866, 876·81 (5th Cir. 1988)
(discussing ability to pay and nonmonetary sanctions for appropriate cases).
128
E.g., Moore v. Roth, No. A-01422, 1990 WL 60735 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 1990) (involving
prose litigant); Goldberg v. Weil, 707 F. Supp. 357, 362 (N.D. lll. 1989) (involving prose
litigant); Solberg v. Inline Corp., 740 F. Supp. 680, 686 (D. Minn. 1990) (finding no violation
of Rule 11 in weak COBRA case); Summer v. Fuller, 718 F. Supp. 1523, 1525 (N.D. Ga.
1989) (finding no violation of Rule 11 in civil rights case of first impression).
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levy large monetary assessments against civil rights plaintiffs or
their counsel. 121
The Fourth Circuit contributed to these national trends. For example, one panel of the court, when vacating a trial judge's decision that Rule 11 had been violated in Title VII litigation,
observed:
Even a vague and conclusory complaint may be "well
grounded in fact and . . . warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Indeed, if
Rule 11 permitted sanctions merely on the basis of inartful pleading, rather than for a failure to investigate
the legal and factual basis for that pleading, Rule 12(e)
motions for a more definite statement would be virtually
unheard of. 128
Other panels expressed similar concern for civil rights plaintiffs
and lawyers when reviewing sanctions that district courts
imposed. 129
The conclusion that Rule ll's application improved between
early 1988 and September 1990 must be qualified. Some judges apparently failed to appreciate several subtleties involved in enforcing Rule 11 130 or were insufficiently attentive to the needs of civil

127
See, e.g., the district court opinion referred to in Banov, 899 F.2d at 40, 42; Cruz v.
Savage, 691 F. Supp. 549, 556 (D.P.R. 1988) (noting this reluctance), aff'd, 896 F.2d 626 (1st
Cir. 1990).
128
Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1990).
129
See, e.g., Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 899 F.2d 271, 290 (4th Cir.) (affirming
district court's denial of sanctions without review), reh'g granted and vacated on other
grounds, 922 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1990) (en bane), on reh'g, 925 F.2d 703 (4th Cir.) (en bane),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2814 (1991); Introcaso v. Cunningham, 857 F.2d 965, 970 (4th Cir.
1988) (vacating award of sanctions because district court's findings were insufficient to jus·
tify sanctions).
130
Most important was the failure to differentiate between the "product" (focusing on
the complaint or other documents) and "conduct" (focusing on prefiling inquiry) approaches
to Rule 11 decisionmaking. See, e.g., Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1429 (9th
Cir. 1989) (finding complaint not frivolous and denying sanctions on that basis rather than
analyzing reasonableness of plaintiff's investigation); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified
Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1091 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding sanctions against civil rights
plaintiff for frivolous claim). See generally Burbank, supra note 20, at 1933-34, 1941-42
(sugges~ing that judges impose sanctions for conduct reasons only); Tobias, supra note 24,
at 168 (noting that courts use frivolous-product approach).
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rights plaintiffs when choosing sanctions.131 Moreover, the improvements observed have been in formal Rule 11 decisionmaking.
This distinction is important because a significant quantity of Rule
11 activity is informal, as is much activity that is most detrimental
to civil rights plaintiffs. 132 Furthermore, in June 1990, the Supreme
Court prescribed a very deferential abuse-of-discretion standard
for appellate review of trial court Rule 11 decisionmaking. 133
Additional developments that did not directly involve the Rule's
judicial application could lead to improvements for civil rights
plaintiffs. The Advisory Committee, during its regularly scheduled
meeting in November 1989, spent one-half day discussing Rule ll's
implementation. Two representatives of public interest organizations presented evidence that the Rule was detrimentally affecting
civil rights plaintiffs. 134 At the conclusion of the meeting, the Committee informally agreed to explore the possibility of an
amendment. 1311
A short time thereafter, Representative Robert Kastenmeier,
Chairman of the House Committee on the Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Administration of Justice, contacted Judge John
Grady, Chairman of the Advisory Committee, requesting informa131
See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544 (S.D. Fin. 1989) (imposing $1 million
sanction against civil rights plaintiff), aff'd, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 913 (1992).
10
• Formal Rule 11 activity leads to the issuance of an opinion tlw.t is published in the
federal reporter system or is available on one of the computerized reporting systems. Informal Rule 11 activity is all other activity, including threats to invoke the Rule. Informal
activity can be more detrimental because it is difficult to detect, document, and alter at the
appellate level. See generally Tobias, supra note 31, at 117 (arguing tlw.t hostility to litigants is more likely to appear in informal settings).
1
See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) (prescribing deferential
"
abuse-of-discretion standard for appellate review). Another recent Supreme Court Rule 11
opinion could be detrimental to civil rights plaintiffs, because it applies the Rule's requirements to represented parties who sign papers. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991); see also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 112 S. Ct.. 1076 (1992)
(allowing courts to impose Rule 11 sanctions when court is later determined to be without
subject-matter jurisdiction).
1
" ' They were attorney Alan Morrison of Public Citizen and Professor Laura Macklin of
the Georgetown University Law Center Institute for Public Representation. Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. R.Ev. 795, 854 n.310 (1991).
1
•• Telephone Interview with Charles Geyh, Professor of Law, Widener University, Harrisburg, Pa., and former counsel, House Committee on the Courts, Intellectual Property,
and the Administration of Justice (June 17, 1992). See generally Mullenix, supra note 134,
at 854.
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tion on the committee's consideration of Rule 11.136 In February
1990, Judge Grady responded to Representative Kastenmeier, expressing his belief that there was considerable need for additional
study of the Rule and for more data on its operation. 137
Professor Arthur Miller, who was the Reporter for the Advisory
Committee when the Supreme Court and Congress promulgated
the 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
wrote in July 1990 that "[i]t would be unfortunate if the decibel
level of the debate over Rule 11 led to its precipitous revision
before sufficient experience accumulated." 138 Professor Miller asserted that "considerable progress has been made" but urged patience, recognizing that the process of refining the Rule's enforcement "will take many more years.m 39
On July 24, 1990, nearly seven years after amended Rule 11 became effective, the Advisory Committee announced that it was initiating a study of Rule 11.140 The Committee called for the public
to submit written comments on the Rule's operation by November
1; scheduled a hearing for February 1991, at which time it planned
to receive oral testimony; and said that it would consider revision
of Rule 11 at the Committee's regular meeting in April 1991. 141

v.
A.

THE CIRCUIT COURT OPINION

GENERAL OVERVIEW

On September 18, 1990, a panel of the Fourth Circuit issued its
opinion in In re Kunstler. 142 The appellate court reviewed all of
Telephone Interview, supra note 135.
Letter from Judge John Grady, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
to Rep. Robert Kastenmeier, Chairman of the House Committee on the Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Administration of Justice (Feb. 9, 1990) (copy on file with the Georgia
Law Review).
136
Arthur R. Miller, The New Certification Standard Under Rule 11, 130 F.R.D. 479, 505
(1990).
139
Id. Professor Melissa Nelken, who has studied Rule 11 closely, urged similar caution
while recommending constructive changes in the Rule. See Melissa Nelken, Has the Chan·
cellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 383, 385, 405-08 (1990) (arguing against repeal of Rule 11); cf. Carl Tobias,
Certification and Civil Rights, 136 F.R.D. 223 (1991) (response to Professor Miller's article).
14
° Call for Comments, supra note 30, at 344-45. See generally Mullenix, supra note 134,
at 854.
1 1
Call for Comments, supra note 30, at 345.
•
142
914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991). On the same day, a
different panel issued an opinion in another controversial civil rights case involving Julius
136
137
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the trial judge's determinations pursuant to an abuse-of-discretion
standard. 143 It found that the defendants' failure to notify the trial
judge or plaintiffs before dismissal that the state and the county
intended to invoke Rule 11 would not preclude consideration of a
motion for sanctions under the Rule.144 The Fourth Circuit upheld
the lower court's decision that Kunstler, Nakell and Pitts had contravened all three prongs of Rule 11.m The appellate panel vacated and remanded for reconsideration the district judge's determination regarding the appropriate sanction. The circuit court
found that the lower court had based its assessment on the erroneous propositions that Rule ll's principal purpose was compensation and that publicizing the litigation's allegations was behavior
punishable under the Rule. 146 The panel held that due process required that the attorneys have an opportunity to challenge the
type and amount of sanctions imposed, although the court said
that the district judge need not hold an evidentiary hearing for any
of his Rule 11 decisions. 1" 7
Several aspects of the Fourth Circuit determination are particularly striking and warrant criticism. The appellate court reviewed
the trial court's determination with extreme deference, failing to
scrutinize the district court's findings that plaintiffs' counsel contravened the Rule and selectively considering the plaintiffs' assertions. The Fourth Circuit accepted uncritically, and adopted nearly
verbatim, many propositions, even ideas relating to legal issues, in
the trial judge's opinion. The appellate panel also refused to delve
deeply into the case's factual background, endorsing wholeheartedly the trial court's version of the facts, while failing to mention
the seventy-page memorandum that Nakell filed in response to
Chambers, Executive Director of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, which was an appeal
from the decision of a different judge in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Blue v.
United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding counsel's conduct warranted sanctions but district court failed to exercise selectivity in imposing wide range of
sanctions and to be sensitive to deterrence its decision may have on future Title VII litigants with meritorious claims), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). Although disposition of
the two cases was similar, the two panels' scrutiny of the facts and treatment of the attorneys contrasts markedly. Some of those contrasts will be examined in the footnotes below.
143
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 513 (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404
(1990)) •.
iu Id. at 512-13 .
... Id. at 513-21.
14 Id. at 522-25.
•
147
Id. at 521-22.
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questions at oral argument. 148 This type of appellate review penalizes parties found to have violated Rule 11 in cases such as this one
when district judges vigorously apply the provision.
B.

SPECIFIC ANALYSIS

1. Sanctions After Dismissal. The panel first observed that the
defendants' failure before dismissal to notify the plaintiffs or the
district' court of the defendants' intent to seek Rule 11 sanctions
would not necessarily bar a sanctions motion. 149 The appellate
court acknowledged that certain equitable factors, such as a party's
promise not to pursue sanctions or an inordinately long delay after
voluntary dismissal before filing a Rule 11 motion, could preclude
sanctions. 1110 Because the State invoked Rule 11 six weeks after dismissal and the county filed its motion several weeks later, the
panel found that the delay did not prejudice the plaintiffs' lawyers
and that the district judge properly considered the motion. 161 In
comparison, some courts have held that a district judge should not
grant a: Rule 11 motion filed after a plaintiff has sought dismissal
under Rule 4l(a)(2) and after entry of an order dismissing with
prejudice upon the defendant's consent, if the order includes no
term or condition reserving the right to seek sanctions. 152 Defendants who wish to preserve the right to invoke Rule 11 normally
should respond with cross-motions to the plaintiffs' Rule 4l(a)(2)
motion to dismiss. 1113 Numerous courts have denied sanctions motions that defendants filed after Rule 4l(a)(2) dismissals when the
parties failed to reserve their rights. 1114
148

Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3.
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 512-13.
100
Id. at 513.
IOI Id.
••• See, e.g., Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 133-35 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing to allow
Rule 11 sanctions after voluntary dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2)); see also
Lau v. Glendora Unified School Dist., 792 F.2d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing plaintiff's right to withdraw voluntary dismissal rather than comply with order imposing attorney's fees); Andes v. Versant Corp., 788 F.2d 1033, 1037 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing proper
use of Rule 41(a)(2) by district court).
3
••
See, e.g., Greenberg v. Hilton Int'! Co., 870 F.2d 926, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting
defendant's cross-motion for sanctions, fees, and costs); Kya-Hill v. Davidson, No. 87 CIV.
7802 (JES), 1988 WL 108487 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 1988) (noting that defendants could file
cross-motion after 41(a)(2) dismissal).
••• See, e.g., Roe v. Operation Rescue, Civ. A. No. 88-5157, 1989 WL 66452 (E.D. Pa. June
19, 1989) (holding motions after final judgment untimely), order aff'd, 892 F.2d 142 (3d
149
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2. Violations of Rule 11. The trial judge found that plaintiffs'
counsel had contravened Rule 11 's three prongs. The Fourth Circuit first examined the liability of Kunstler, who said that he did
not participate actively in the case but depended on Nakell, "who
was on the scene, to prepare and file it." 111 t1 The appellate panel
decided that a recent Supreme Court pronouncement supported
the district judge's determination that Kunstler's complete reliance on another attorney itself contravened Rule 11.1116
a. Well Grounded in Fact. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the
district court judge that the factual misstatements in the complaint were pervasive and that these errors involved information
that the plaintiffs' attorneys knew or should have known. 1117 The
panel also remarked that some causes of action were premised on
allegations that "utterly lacked" any factual basis, commenting
that such claims constitute the very litigation abuse at which Rule
11 is aimed. 1158 The Fourth Circuit correspondingly upheld the trial
judge's findings that many allegations against local and state officials were factually unsubstantiated or were irrelevant to the
case.1159 The relationship between discovery and Rule 11 also was
important to the appellate court's determinations. The panel
stated that for the Rule's purposes, the prefiling factual investigation to support a complaint generally will suffice, if all of the information that can be secured before suit substantiates the pleading's
allegations, although additional facts must be secured with discovery to prove the claim ultimately. 160
The Fourth Circuit chastised the plaintiffs' attorneys for including factual inaccuracies, irrelevant material, and unsupported allegations in the complaint. The panel's treatment of the facts warCir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 385 (1990); Feldman v. Village of Lombard, No. SS C 3295,
1987 WL 9000 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 1987) (holding that defendants had waived rights during
4l(a)(2) hearing).
1
•• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 513-14 (emphasis added by court).
1
•• See id. at 514 (citing Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, Di\•. of Cadence Indus. Corp., 493 U.S. 120 (1989)). "Having failed in his responsibility, l.\ir. Kunstler
may not now be heard to protest that he does not share in any violations of Rule 11 which
are evident on the face of the complaint." Id.
107
See id. (rejecting plaintiffs' claim that errors were isolated).
10
• Id. at 514-15. The example used was the allegation regarding a "no state prosecution"
agreement, which the court found that North Carolina law did not authorize. Id.
1
•• "[T]he complaint was filled with irrelevant allegations not tied to specific injuries to
plaintiffs ••.." Id. at 515.
1
•• Id. at 516.
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rants criticism, however. Most important, the court considered the
complaint filed to the almost total exclusion of the attorneys' behavior in conducting the factual investigation that preceded the
complaint's drafting, thus significantly de-emphasizing Rule ll's
reasonable prefiling inquiry language.
The Fourth Circuit accepted most of the defendants' speculations and rejected practically all of the plaintiffs' evidence. The
court concomitantly gave virtually no credence to the explanations
of plaintiffs' counsel for their actions in performing the factual inquiry and actually capitalized on the explanations to disparage the
attorneys. For instance, Nakell and Pitts proffered thorough "affidavits, correspondence, court papers," and proofs of the time spent
investigating to detail the reasonableness of their factual inquiry.161 The panel responded that the lawyers had offered no excuse for the numerous clear errors of fact in their complaint, particularly given the ample time that they ostensibly had to prepare
the pleading and the hours purportedly expended in drafting it. 162
Moreover, the circuit court mischaracterized and selectively analyzed certain allegations in the plaintiffs' pleading, undertook scant
review of the pertinent underlying facts, adopted uncritically much
material in the district judge's opinion, and embraced his version
of the facts, although the trial court had little more familiarity
with the facts than the appellate court. 163 Illustrative of most of
these phenomena is the emphasis accorded to allegations that the
Sheriff was participating in drug trafficking. 164 Nakell vehemently
and convincingly denied that the plaintiffs had made such an allegation; in any event, whatever allusion they made to drug trafficking was inconsequential. 1615
Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 18.
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 516.
183
The panel arguably seized on "isolated factual errors," thus violating its own precedent in Forrest Creek Assocs. v. McLean Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 831 F.2d 1238, 1244-45 (4th
Cir. 1987). Cf. Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 540 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that complaint's allegations and supporting evidence should be set forth with "generous
reading" they are due or with "strongest evidence" they presented), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1580 (1991). But see Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 514 (noting errors not isolated but pervaded
complaint). As to the trial court's limited familiarity with the facts, see supra note 88; infra
note 225 and accompanying text.
18
' See Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 515 (suggesting that allegations were scandalous and
sensational).
18
• Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3, at 2-3; cf. Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 23
(noting panel's mischaracterization of complaint's central allegations).
181

182
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The appellate court also seemed to suggest that plaintiffs in the
Fourth Circuit can rely less on discovery for Rule 11 purposes than
plaintiffs in other circuits, including the Seventh Circuit, several of
whose members have championed vigorous enforcement of the
Rule. 166 This issue is important because, in civil rights cases, plaintiffs often depend substantially on information that can be secured
only through discovery, since the material is in the minds or files
of defeiidants-in this case, law enforcement officials. 167 The role
of discovery is significant to the instant case because the case involved a multitude of sharply disputed factual issues, some of
which could not be clarified or resolved until discovery. 168
Finally, several examples demonstrate the panel's selective approach to appellate review. First, the Fourth Circuit found that a
single subcomponent of one of the plaintiffs' six claims lacked a
factual basis, 169 but the court failed to analyze closely the other,
more substantial factual premises in the complaint. The district
judge and the panel also seized on a lone sentence in the plaintiffs'
memorandum that sought expedited discovery; both courts inferred that the lawyers "relied entirely upon discovery in the hope
of finding some factual support for many of their claims" and con166
Compare Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that use
of discovery to learn facts of case is reasonable) (discussed in Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 516) and
Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Fed'n, 836 F.2d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that
use of discovery to prove case is permissible) with Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp.,
823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that use of discovery as sole means of establishing case is impermissible), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988). See also supra note 35 and
accompanying text (discussing Seventh Circuit judges' advocacy of vigorous enforcement of
Rule 11).
167
See Tobias, supra note 19, at 494-95, 498 (citing Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987), as valuable illustration of civil rights action
in which important information was in minds and records of defendants as well as for statement that "those who challenge police violations of an individual's civil rights need not
secure the detailed information required to prove patterns of supervisory misconduct prior
to filing, because citizens are 'extremely unlikely' to have that data before formal
discovery").
168
For instance, whether the state authorities indicated to Hatcher that there was a "no
state prosecution" agreement was a significant, sharply contested factual issue. Similarly,
establishing the "tool of the same authorities" exception that would permit a double jeopardy claim was dependent on showing a nexus between federal and state prosecutors. Both
required discovery, which the district judge prevented. Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at
18; see also supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing court-ordered stay of
discovery).
160
This was the claim that there had been a "no state prosecution" agreement, one of
several premises for seeking injunctive relief. Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 29 & n.3.
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eluded that this dependence indicated an "unacceptable level of
pre-filing investigation." 110 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit practically ignored counsel's prefiling inquiry,1 71 a phenomenon illustrated by this terse quotation charging an "unacceptable level of
pre-filing investigation." In fact, in the court's only other reference
to the investigation, it concluded that the investigation failed to
excuse the "many clear factual errm;s" included in the complaint.172 The panel's focus on the quality of the product-the
complaint, its factual allegations, and counsel's ability to prove
them-to the nearly complete exclusion of the attorneys' behavior
in performing the prefiling inquiry that underlies the paper improperly underemphasizes significant language in Rule 11.173 Elevating the importance of product over conduct is particularly inadvisable in cases, such as this one, in which there is a wealth of
information available regarding the prefiling investigation that
plaintiffs actually undertook. 174

110
In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 515 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991).
The sentence was in counsel's memorandum in opposition to the State's motion seeking a
protective order. It emphasized that the discovery sought would permit plaintiffs' counsel to
augment their evidence and satisfy Rule 65(b)'s requirements for temporary injunctive relief. Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 43-44 & n.14. Rule 65(b) states:
A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or oral notice to
the adverse party or that party's attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from
specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate
and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the
adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the
applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which
have been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting the claim that
notice should not be required.
FED. R. C1v. P. 65(b).
111
The panel extracted little from the record or from Nakell's post-oral-argument memo·
randum, supra note 3, both of which detailed the extensive prefiling inquiry that counsel
conducted. Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 41 & n.12.
172
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 516. The court identified one kind of alleged error, and that
error implicated the plaintiffs' allegations regarding several officials who made policy for
Robeson County. The panel rejected the claims because the officers were state employees,
not county officials. The panel asserted that this distinction was integral to the complaint
and the allegation of a countywide conspiracy; however, the panel was wrong. Pitts Petition,
supra note 1, at 45-57.
173
See supra note 100 for the relevant language from Rule 11. The court should initially
attempt to determine whether counsel performed a reasonable prefiling inquiry (conduct).
Only when that effort proves inconclusive should the judge analyze the papers (product)
that the inquiry yielded to make the reasonableness determination. Tobias, supra note 31,
at 108 n.11.
"' "Nakell and Pitts were entirely steeped in the facts of the case and had made a thor·
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b. Well Grounded in Law. The Fourth Circuit upheld the trial
judge's determination that the plaintiffs' attorneys filed a complaint that "ori the whole was not well grounded in law."170 The
analysis resembled the appellate review of the district court's finding that the pleading was not well-grounded in fact. The panel essentially ignored the prefiling inquiry that counsel conducted, the
plaintiffs' substantial claims, and their arguments for extending
existing law. It emphasized, however, several relatively insignificant claims that the trial judge decided were unsubstantiated and
adopted practically whole cloth the lower court's treatment. 116
The sanctioned attorneys argued that the defendants' lengthy
answers to the complaint and the approval of the complaint by a
civil rights lawyer with expertise in section 1983 litigation substantiated the validity of the complaint's legal premise. The Fourth
Circuit flatly rejected these arguments. m The court stated that the
length of the defendants' responses would not make otherwise unsupported claims legitimate and might signify only that there were
numerous meritorious defenses. 118 Merely securing review of a
pleading by an attorney with specialized knowledge did not satisfy
Rule 11, because that lawyer may have little familiarity with the
particular facts, the pertinent law, or the prefiling investigation.119
The panel's summary treatment of the contentions of the sanctioned attorneys, especially regarding review of the complaint, accorded insufficient importance to whether the plaintiffs performed
a reasonable prefiling inquiry. 180
The Fourth Circuit then analyzed what it characterized as "several substantial claims" that the trial judge determined lacked legal foundation. 181 The panel held the plaintiffs' double jeopardy

ough investigation. The papers filed .•• included a massive collection of affida\its, corre·
spondence, court papers and materials .•••" Kuns tier Petition, supra note 6, at 18.
"" Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 518.
176
For example, the panel apparently conducted virtually no independent research on the
legal issues.
177
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 516-17.
n8 Id.
11
• Id. at 517.
18
° Counsel seemed to offer the details of the review principally to show reasonable conduct, although the panel emphasized product. See generally supra note 173.
1 1
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 517. The court also ignored the cltlims, such as those invoMng
•
the First Amendment, that the plaintiffs' counsel considered substantial. See supra text
accompanying note 176.
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claim inapplicable to subsequent prosecutions by different sovereigns.182 The court acknowledged the "tool of the same authorities"
exception but found that it should be restricted to situations that
involved limited state participation. 183 The panel held the exception inapplicable because the complaint alleged that state officials
orchestrated the state prosecution, even though counsel had made
a plausible good-faith argument for extending the exception to instances in which state, not federal, officials predominate. 184
The appellate court next upheld the district judge's decision that
the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claim had no legal support, stating that the Amendment's "protection is personal to the individual
whose testimony is being compelled."1811 The Fourth Circuit observed that the plaintiffs' counsel "as experienced attorneys should
have been well aware of this" constitutional rule and criticized
them for not attempting "to explain away this glaring blunder."186
The treatment reveals more about the appellate court than the
lawyers. As Nakell stated in his memorandum filed after oral argument, the trial judge and the circuit court chose to ignore the
plaintiffs' substantial and correctly pleaded Sixth Amendment
claim and instead seized upon a minor mistake in one paragraph
that also based the claim on the Fifth Amendment. 187
The panel affirmed the district court's determination that abstention doctrine clearly precluded plaintiffs from enjoining state
criminal proceedings. 188 The Fourth Circuit, relying on contrary intracircuit precedent, refused to find that exceptional circumstances
justifying federal intervention exist when prosecutions are pursued

Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 517.
Id. (citing United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). The exception is
that a state prosecution that follows an unsuccessful federal prosecution can violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment if the state prosecution results from ma·
nipulation by federal authorities. United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Neither the Supreme Court nor the District of Columbia Circuit, however, has limited the
exception in the way the Fourth Circuit limited it.
184
The argument for extension is that the exception should apply equally to ·state and
federal authorities. Petition For Rehearing and Suggestion For Rehearing In Banc at 9,
Kunstler (No. 89-2815) [hereinafter Petition for Rehearing].
18
° Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 517.
188 Id.
187
Memorandum of Nakell, supra note 3, at A12 n.3; accord Petition for Rehearing,
supra note 184, at 7; Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 35 & n.8.
188
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 517.
182

183
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to discourage citizens from exercising constitutional rights. 189 The
plaintiffs, however, had offered two convincing grounds for distinguishing that case. 190 Moreover, even if the precedent were controlling within the circuit, Rule 11 expressly permits good-faith arguments for changes in the law that are premised on decisions of the
Supreme Court and other circuits. 191
The Fourth Circuit likewise upheld the trial judge's finding that
a number of claims raised serious standing difficulties. 192 The panel
invoked a narrow example and technically applied standing doctrille to require that Hatcher and Jacobs show concrete and specific harm; the court determined that the particular plaintiffs had
failed to make this showing because they had the fortitude to resist
governmental intimidation. 193

Id. The precedent is Suggs v. Brannon, 804 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1980).
In Suggs, the plaintiffs argued that the obscenity statute under which they were prosecuted was unconstitutional. 804 F.2d at 277-78. Moreover, the court in Suggs relied on language in a footnote in a Supreme Court opinion stating that "bad faith in this context generally means" a certain type of prosecution. Id. at 278 (citing Kugler v. Helfont, 421 U.S.
117, 126 n.6 (1975) (emphasis added)). Use of the term "generally," which lea..-es open the
possibility of specific exceptions, makes plausible the type of argument premised on "bad
- faith" prosecution in Kunstler. See generally Petition for Rehearing, supra note 184, at 1112 (distinguishing Suggs).
191
Rule 11 states,
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer
that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best
of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable in·
quiry it is well grounded in facf and is warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. . . .
FED. R. Crv. P. 11; cf. United States v. Stringfellow, 911 F.2d 225, 226 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that precedent from district court in another federal circuit contrary to position of
plaintiff does not render position frivolous); Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 801 F.2d 746,
758-59 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that absence of First Circuit precedent did not preclude
good-faith argument for extension of law); Danese v. City of Roseville, 757 F. Supp. 827, 830
(E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that precedent in other circuits contrary to party's position does
not render that position unreasonable); see Petition for Rehearing, supra note 184, at 11
(arguing that challenges to controlling precedent in circuit do not violate Rule 11 as long as
consistent with Supreme Court and other circuits' opinions); cf. Kunstler Petition, supra
note 6, at 19 (arguing that discovery is necessary on exceptional-circumstances issue).
192
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 517.
193
Id. at 517-18. Hatcher and Jacobs, however, did show the kinds of particularized identifiable governmental violations of rights that other courts have held to afford a reasonable
basis for stating a cognizable claim for the purposes of Rule 11. See, e.g., Meese v. Keene,
481 U.S. 465, 472-75 (holding that risk of injury to reputation and of impairment to political
career provided plaintiff with standing to challenge governmental action); Allee v. Medrano,
416 U.S. 802, 811-14 (1974) (holding that persistent pattern of police misconduct is suilicient basis for federal court to exercise equitable powers); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 27
2

••

190
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c. Improper Purpose. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's determination that counsel filed suit for an improper purpose and its decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue for similar reasons. 194 The panel stated that the finding of improper purpose was not "clearly erroneous," was supported by the
baseless allegations made in the complaint and by the "cumulative
nature of the evidence," and would not have been modified had the
district judge held an evidentiary hearing. m
The appellate court remarked that Rule ll's definition of improper purpose, which includes considerations such as harassment
or causing unwarranted delay or unnecessary increase in litigation
expense, is not exclusive. 198 The circuit panel observed that it
would be improper to file a complaint that did not have as its central and sincere purpose the vindication of rights in court. 197 This
articulation is simply incorrect; the Supreme Court has long held
that the First Amendment right to petition prohibits punishing
persons who pursue legitimate litigation for an apparently inappropriate purpose. 198 This Fourth Circuit ruling is one of several entered in extremely controversial cases in which judges premised
findings of Rule 11 violations on determinations that plaintiffs had
instituted suit primarily for a purpose other than vindicating
rights through the legal process. 199

(D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Whatever authority the Government may have to interfere with a group
engaged in unlawful activity, ... it is never permissible to impede or deter lawful civil
rights/political organization, expression or protest with no other direct purpose and no other
immediate objective than to counter the influence of the target associations."). See gener·
ally Petition for Rehearing, supra note 184, at 4-5 (discussing plaintiffs' showing of specific
harm).
19
' Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 518-21.
19
• Id. at 520-21. The panel's invocation of a "clearly erroneous" standard is curious because it specifically stated that an abuse-of-discretion standard would govern. Id. at 513.
19
• Id. at 518.
191 Id.
198
See, e.g., Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (holding that
well-founded lawsuit brought for retaliatory purposes is not to be enjoined as unfair business practice); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11
(1972) (finding that parties are entitled to use courts to "advocate their causes and points of
view·respecting resolution of their business and economic interests in relation to their competitors" unless argument is nothing more than attempt to interfere directly with business
of competitors).
199
E.g., Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 932
(1990); Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 913 (1992).
In Saltany, 55 citizens and residents of Libya filed suit to recover for injuries sustained in
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The appeals court stated that the district judge's conclusion that
the plaintiffs' attorneys never intended to litigate the case most
strongly supported the improper-purpose finding. 200 The presence
of so many allegations that lacked a basis in law or fact justified
this finding. 201 The existence of baseless allegations could be due to
inexperience or incompetence, which would not require a finding of
improper purpose.202 The panel reasoned, however, that the insertion of baseless allegations in the complaint could not be ascribed
to inexperience because the attorneys clearly were experienced,
while the number of claims lacking foundation suggested that the
assertions were not attributable to incompetence.203 The court assumed that "counsel wilfully included the baseless claims" and
that a judge could infer that the lawyers had filed the lawsuit to
harass or for some purpose other than vindicating their clients'

the 1986 bombing of their country by the United States. 886 F.2d at 439. The trial judge
dismissed the complaint but rejected Rule 11 sanctions in an effort to maintain federal
courts as fora for litigation brought as a "public statement of protest of Presidential action
with which counsel (and, to be sure, their clients) were in profound disagreement." Id.
(quoting district court opinion in Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 322 (D.D.C. 19SS)).
The appellate court summarily reversed, instructed the district judge to levy an appropriate
sanction, and observed that it did "not conceive it a proper function of a federal court to
serve as a forum for 'protests,' to the detriment of parties with serious disputes waiting to
be heard." Id. at 440.
Avirgan arguably resembles Saltany, insofar as the litigation can be characterized as a
protest against allegedly inappropriate political behavior of the United States in Latin
America. In Avirgan, journalists filed suit to recover for injuries sustained in a bombing at a
press conference in Nicaragua. 932 F.2d at 1575. The plaintiffs' lead counsel supplemented
the complaint with a detailed affidavit outlining the purported testimony of 79 witnesses
who counsel claimed had knowledge that the defendants set and exploded the bomb. Id. at
1581. The plaintiffs' counsel, however, would not provide the names of these witnesses and,
thus, prevented the defendants from deposing those witnesses and delayed orderly discovery. Id. At the same time, the plaintiffs were permitted to conduct two years of discovery.
Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544, 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1989). When the plaintiffs' counsel eventually complied with the order to reveal the names of their witnesses, the court discovered
that approximately 20 of the 79 were unknown to the plaintiffs' counsel, several did not
know or had not spoken to the plaintiffs' counsel, and the remainder could not furnish any
admissible statements. 932 F.2d at 1581. Upholding the award or costs and attorneys' fees
after undertaking very deferential review, the court stated, "[F]iling a lawsuit is not a gratuitous license to conduct infinite forays in search or evidence." Id. at 1582 (quoting Collins v.
Walden, 834 F.2d 961, 965 (11th Cir. 1987)).
200
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 519.
201 Id.
202
Id.
2
•• Id.
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rights. 20'
The appellate panel also stated that the trial judge "inferred an
improper purpose from the timing" of the complaint's filing and of
its dismissal, 205 while he considered incredible or absurd the explanations that counsel proffered. 208 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged
that the attorneys had submitted affidavits that sharply disputed
the district judge's determinations.207 The appellate court, however, refused to find clearly erroneous the trial judge's decisions
that the explanations were not believable or reasonable, given all
of the evidence regarding the filing of the pleading and the frivolous character of the allegations asserted. 208
The Fourth Circuit did caution that district courts should exercise particular care in assessing the purpose of a party or an attorney who signs a pleading or other court document, adding that an
evidentiary hearing might be required when there are credibility
issues, contested factual questions, or reasoned explanations of
purpose afforded. 200 The panel apparently failed to appreciate that
these were the very types of factors that underlay much of the trial
judge's improper-purpose finding arid its own affirmance of that
decision. Indeed, each court's resolution of the improper-purpose
question is problematic, because both are grounded in unsupported
speculation, inference derived from apparently false premises, and
the rejection of counsel's rational explanations. 210
204
20

•

Id.
Id. Plaintiffs filed on the "eve of the anniversary of the takeover of The Robesonian."

Id.
206
The trial court found incredible the explanation that numerous claims had become
moot and absurd the assertion that the "wide-spread conspiracy involving high-level" officials suddenly had become insignificant. Id.
207
Id. at 520.
2os Id.
20
• Id. The panel criticized several additional aspects of the trial judge's improper-purpose determination, such as his consideration of improper purpose before reasonable prefiling inquiry. Id. at 518. The weight of authority is against sanctioning for improper purpose
when a reasonable inquiry precedes a paper's filing. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank, 852
F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that counsel's reliance on several decisions from
another jurisdiction and on conference with bankruptcy judge before filing complaint indicated reasonable inquiry and precluded sanctions); Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, 836
F.2d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[A] complaint that is found to be well-grounded in fact
and law cannot be sanctioned as harassing, regardless of the attorney's subjective intent.").
210
The Fourth Circuit's convoluted reasoning discussed in the text accompanying notes
203-204 is typical. See generally Pitts Petition, supra note 1, at 57-59. The panel again
seemed to emphasize product unduly, especially in light of considerable evidence regarding
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3. Due Process. The Fourth Circuit held that "due process does
not require an evidentiary hearing before sanctions are imposed,"
even when the court depends in part on Rule ll's improperpurpose prong.211 The panel relied substantially on a leading Fifth
Circuit case and the Advisory Committee Note that accompanied
Rule 11 to ascertain whether, and if so what type of, a hearing is
necessary before a judge levies sanctions.212 An observation in the
Note, which the Fifth Circuit and many other courts recite, is that,
when the court's involvement in the substantive proceedings affords it thorough appreciation of the facts needed to resolve Rule
11 issues, additional inquiry will be unnecessary.213 The Fifth Circuit correspondingly stated that if a judge must resolve credibility
questions or decide whether a good-faith legal argument can be asserted, some type of hearing often will be appropriate. 214
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the number of determinations involving credibility that the district judge made in the absence of an evidentiary hearing should have suggested that such a
proceeding would have been worthwhile. 2111 Nonetheless, the panel
found the trial court's participation in the litigation adequate to
provide it full knowledge of the relevant facts without the need for
an evidentiary hearing. 216 The appellate court also decided that
due process was satisfied, because the district judge afforded counsel the opportunity to contest his determinations of Rule 11 violations through the submission of "voluminous written legal arguments,'' affidavits, and thorough participation in oral argument. 217
The Fourth Circuit held, however, that the lawyers must have an
opportunity to contest the type and amount of sanctions levied,
especially given their large monetary nature. 216 It therefore re-

conduct. See supra note 173.
211
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 521.
212
Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987); FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory
committee's note.
213
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 521 (citing Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1561 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 11
advisory committee's note)). The court in Donaldson observed that this situation often
arises when the judge has ruled on the legal or factual merits of motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment. 819 F.2d at 1561 n.13.
m Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 521 (citing Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1561).
"" Id. at 522.
210 Id.
211 Id.
21s Id.
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mantled the determinations to the trial court for reconsideration. 210
The Fourth Circuit found unpersuasive the precedent that the
plaintiffs' counsel cited for the proposition that a hearing should
be required when judges premise Rule 11 sanctions on bad faith or
when issues of credibility are involved.220 The panel correspondingly rejected the lawyers' contention that an evidentiary hearing
was necessary in this lawsuit, even if not in all cases implicating
the question of improper purpose. 221
The court's due process analysis is problematic in several respects. The panel unduly de-emphasized those cases stating that
due process requires a hearing if a Rule 11 violation is predicated
on bad faith or if issues of credibility are implicated. 222 Indeed, the
Third Circuit recently suggested that a hearing should be held "to
resolve disputes of material fact when the cold record may not disclose the full story. " 223 Even the sources that the Fourth Circuit
invoked, namely the Fifth Circuit case and the Advisory Committee Note, indicate that counsel for plaintiffs were due more process
than they received in the instant case. 224 The notion that a trial
court's participation in litigation could give it complete understanding of the pertinent facts is simply inapplicable, because the
judge had no substantive involvement before the defendants
sought sanctions, and he entered the Rule 11 proceeding with severely limited knowledge of the lawsuit. 2211 Finally, a hearing was
needed to resolve many disputed issues of credibility raised by nu-

"" Id.
220
Id. at 521 (citing Brown v. National Bd. of Medical Examiners, 800 F.2d 168, 173 (7th
Cir. 1986); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194, 206 (7th Cir. 1985); INVST Fin.
Group v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., 815 F.2d 391, 405 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927 (1987)).
The panel found the courts' reasoning scant. Id.
221
"(T]he findings are not clearly erroneous even excluding some evidence of 'improper
motive' which appellants contested." Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 522.
222
See supra note 220 (citing these cases). See generally Kunstler Petition, supra note 6,
at 14-16 (discussing these cases and court's failure to follow them).
22
• Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1359 (3d Cir. 1990). "No precedent
holds that a court may rule on a lawyer's motivation in filing a complaint without hearing
testimony, permitting cross-examination and determining credibility when confronted with
conflicting affidavits as to the facts." Kunstler Petition, supra note 6, at 16.
22
• See supra notes 212-214 and· accompanying text (discussing these sources). See generally Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
22
• The original case was dismissed voluntarily little more than three months after its
filing. The only action taken in that period was a plaintiff's motion for expedited discovery
and defendant's motion for a protective order. Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 511-12.
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merous assertions in the affidavits and papers submitted.226
4. The Sanctions Imposed.
a. Additional Sanctions. The Fourth Circuit found improper the
district judge's imposition of "additional sanctions" of $10,000 on
each of the three lawyers for intentionally filing outrageous claims
and publicizing them. 227 The panel stated that Rule 11 does not
reach all behavior within the judicial process and clearly does not
encompass activity outside of that system. 228
b. Attorney's Fees. The appellate court vacated the amount of
the monetary sanction, finding that the trial judge had erred by
invoking Rule 11 to compensate the defendants and to shift fees. 229
The Fourth Circuit instructed that the Rule should not be blindly
employed as a fee-shifting device. 230 The panel reiterated its view
that judges should levy the "least severe sanction adequate to
serve" the Rule's purposes, adding that Rule ll's principal objective is to "deter future litigation abuse" and that the amount of
financial sanctions always should reflect this purpose.231 The court
admonished trial judges to keep in mind Rule ll's other purposes,
which include reimbursing victims of violations, punishing existing
litigation abuse, streamlining litigation, and promoting court
management.232
The Fourth Circuit offered valuable guidance for district courts
contemplating the imposition of monetary assessments. The panel

22
• See supra text accompanying note 216 (discussing rationale for Fourth Circuit panel's
contrary view).
227
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 525.
22
• Id.; accord Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1990) ("The rule does not
purport to sanction conduct in the course of a lawsuit ••• that does not involve the signing
of pleadings."); Adduono v. World Hockey Ass'n, 824 F.2d 617, 620·22 (8th Cir. 1987)
("Rule 11 is not the proper basis for sanctions against an attorney based on alleged misrepresentation in a settlement agreement.").
22
• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 522.
23
• Id. (citing Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987)); accord Mars Steel Corp.
v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Rule 11 is not a fee·shlfting
device in the sense that the loser pays. It is a law imposing sanctions if counsel files with
improper motives or inadequate investigation.").
2 1
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 523 (noting that district court must choose least severe sanction
•
possible); id. at 522-23 ("[T]he primary •.. purpose of Rule 11 is ta deter future litigation
abuse."); accord Cooter &·Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990) (noting deterrence function); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 871-75 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting
that court must impose least severe sanction necessary ta effectuate deterrence function).
232
Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 522; accord Blue v. United States Dcp't of Army, 914 F.2d 525,
547 (4th Cir. 1990); White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 683 (10th Cir. 1990).
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requested that trial judges clearly explain the reasons for the sanctions they choose to levy, thereby facilitating appellate review of
the propriety of awards. 233 The Fourth Circuit also suggested that
lower courts consult four considerations that the Tenth Circuit recently articulated in White v. General Motors Corp. 234 The panel
embellished those factors.
The first consideration is the reasonableness of the attorney's
fees that the moving party incurred. In White, the Tenth Circuit
stated that calculating the amount of the litigant's reasonable expenses generally is the initial step, 2311 remarking that the injured
party has a duty to mitigate its costs.236 In Kunstler, the Fourth
Circuit provided guidance specific to this case, observing that the
district judge should consider whether the movants failed to mitigate their expenses by invoking Rule 11 after dismissal and
whether the substantial time the defendants devoted to pursuing
sanctions was justified.237 Recapitulating the least-severe-sanction
concept, the panel stated that monetary awards should never be
premised exclusively on the movant's attorney's fees and that "reasonable fees" need not necessarily be actual ones. 238 The appellate
court held that "due process does not require an evidentiary hearing" on reasonableness 239 but that a trial court in its discretion
may allow sanctioned parties to contest their opponents' fee statements. 240 In support of its due process decision, the Fourth Circuit
differentiated the purposes of Rule 11 sanctions from the shifting
••• Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 523; accord Thomas, 836 F.2d at 882-83; Brown v. Federation of
State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1437-40'(7th Cir. 1987).
••• 908 F.2d 675, 684-85 (10th Cir. 1990).
••• Id. at 684. In evaluating reasonableness, the judge should remember that the claim's
frivolous nature is "what justifie[d] the sanction[]." Id.
••• Id.; accord Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1092,
1094 (3d Cir. 1988); Thomas, 836 F.2d at 878-81.
237
Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 523 ("Only attorney time which is in response to that which has
been sanctioned should be evaluated."); accord White, 908 F.2d at 684. Judges should also
consider whether the movants should have given earlier notice of the possible violation.
Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 523.
••• Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 523 (citing Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm Partnership, 850 F.2d 207,
211 (4th Cir. 1988)); accord Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that reasonable fees need not be actual and citing Brown v. Federation of State Medical
Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1439-40 (7th Cir. 1987)).
••• Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 524.
••• Id. When the sanction is large and premised on movants' fee statements, violators
should be allowed to evaluate and contest the charges to help the court in its decisionmaking. Id.

1992]

CIVIL RIGHTS CONUNDRUM

941

of attorney's fees, which fee-shifting statutes prescribe, by observing that offenders have already had the opportunity to contest
Rule violations and by recognizing the need to minimize the number of Rule 11 hearings.241
The minimum amount reasonably needed to deter the conduct
that contravened the Rule constitutes the second factor from
White. 242 The Fourth Circuit explained that trial judges must constantly remember the restricted purpose of Rule 11 and that its
enforcement should not chill the pursuit of facially legitimate litigation or attorneys' creativity in introducing new legal theories. 243
The third consideration is the ability of offenders to pay the
amount assessed. The Tenth Circuit in White analogized sanctions
to punitive damages and inability to pay to an affirmative defense.244 The Fourth Circuit in Kunstler stated that the imposition
of monetary awards absent consideration of this factor would be an
abuse of discretion, admonished judges to refrain from levying
monetary assessments that would bankrupt violators or drive lawyers out of practice,240 and advised that offenders who may be ordered to pay large monetary awards should be permitted to tender
information on their financial status. 246 In the instant case, the
panel instructed that the violators should have been allowed to

241
Id. at 523-24. The court said that Rule 11 sanctions are not principally intended to
compensate but to deter attorney and litigant misconduct, so offenders hnve less interest in
contesting them than in disputing allegations that they violated the Rule in the first place.
Id. at 524. In cases such as this one, however, the reputationo.I nnd resource interests of the
sanctioned attorneys are substantial.
242
White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 684-85 (10th Cir. 1990); accord Doering
v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1988); Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 637 F. Supp. 558, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (revising award upward
but stating sanction must be reasonably necessary to serve Rule ll's purpose), modified and
remanded, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
••• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 524; accord Kraemer v. Grant County, 892 F.2d 686, 690 (7th
Cir. 1990); Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir.), reh'g granted, 875 F.2d
39 (2d Cir. 1989); Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84, 92 (6th Cir. 1988).
... White, 908 F.2d at 685. The offenders have the burden of bringing forward evidence of
their financial status. Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 524. See generally Doering, 857 F.2d at 195-96
(citing case authority on ability to pay) .
... Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 524; accord Doering, 857 F.2d at 195, 196; Tedeschi v. Smith
Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 579 F. Supp. 657, 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), afl'd per curiam, 757
F.2d 465 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985).
"" Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 524-25; accord Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830
F.2d 1429, 1439 (7th Cir. 1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987).
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show that the size of the sanctions would unfairly limit the attorneys' access to federal courts, restrict their ability to practice, or
inflict "great financial distress." 247
A miscellany of considerations comprises the fourth factor. In
White, the Tenth Circuit enumerated the offender's experience,
history, and capability; the violation's severity; the degree of bad
faith or malice implicated in the offense; the risk of chilling effects;
and additional factors deemed proper in specific situations. 248 The
Fourth Circuit found relevant counsel's substantial experience, the
"scandalous and outrageous" character of the allegations they asserted, and the litigation's asserted improper purpose. 249
The Fourth Circuit, in affording guidance on the amount of
monetary sanctions to be imposed, evinced concern for the needs
of civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers. Certain aspects of its treatment, however, remain less solicitous. For example, the panel understated the need for sanctioned parties to have an opportunity to
contest financial awards. 2110 Although the appellate court vacated
the assessments levied, it remanded them for a "reasonableness"
determination to the same district judge who had demonstrated
considerable hostility toward counsel, as evidenced by the imposition of $30,000 in punitive, unauthorized sanctions absent any
semblance of due process. 2111
In short, the Fourth Circuit opinion is deficient in many important respects. The court uncritically adopted much of the trial
judge's opinion, including the court's interpretation of Rule 11 and
its application of the provision to the evidence. 2112 Highly significant was the panel's selective approach to appellate review. The
court affirmed the trial judge's finding that counsel had violated

Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 524.
White, 908 F.2d at 685; accord Doering, 857 F.2d at 196-97. The judge can also increase sanctions for attorneys who previously have been sanctioned and sometimes must
consider the propriety of joint and several liability. Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 525.
••• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 525.
••• See supra note 241 (discussing panel's analysis of attorneys' various interests in averting sanctions).
••• See supra text accompanying note 116 (discussing trial court's imposition of punitive
attorney silnctions); cf. Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 525 (reversing trial court's award of $10,000
against each lawyer).
••• See supra notes 163-165, 181-193 and accompanying text (discussing specific trial
court determinations that appellate court adopted). See generally Petition for Rehearing,
supra note 184, at 1-2 (pointing out flaws in Fourth Circuit opinion).
247

248
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the Rule in filing a "baseless" complaint, yet failed to set forth
fairly the allegations in that complaint or to view generously the
evidence adduced to support them. 2153 The panel considered the
factual and legal premises for only two of six causes of action that
plaintiffs pleaded; totally ignored their strongest claims; focused on
unimportant, isolated factual mistakes in the complaint and on the
plaintiffs' less significant legal claims; and narrowly interpreted the
Claims, rejecting, for example, counsel's arguments for extending
existing law.2154 The Fourth Circuit even seemed to test the plaintiffs' allegations by the erroneous standard of whether the claims
would prevail rather than whether they were plausible and overemphasized the validity of the complaint rather than the reasonableness of the inquiry that supported it.21515
VI.
A.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS RELATING To

IN RE KuNSTLER

PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

In October 1990, Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts filed petitions for
rehearing and suggestions for hearing en banc.2156 On October 11,
1990, the Fourth Circuit denied the petitions, which failed to receive the vote of a single member of the court.2157 The Fourth Circuit responded to the petition with unusual alacrity for a federal
appeals court ostensibly inundated by the litigation explosion and
••• This approach contrasts with the appellate review in Blue v. United States Dep't of
Army, 914 F.2d 525, 540-41 (4th Cir. 1990). The panel in that case gave "plaintiffs' allegations the generous reading" it believed they were due. Id. at 540.
2M For instance, the plaintiffs' First and Sixth Amendment claims received little treatment, the defendants' jurisdictional authority received great emphasis, and the exceptions
to legal rules for which plaintiffs contended received little credence. Cf. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 184, at 1-2 (arguing that appellate court's analysis conflicts with several
Fourth Circuit opinions).
••• Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 514-18. The erroneous standard apparently violates Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990), which asks whether the claims were "reasonable or plausible ••• under the circumstances." The Fourth Circuit in Blue, 914 F.2d at
535-38, as in Kunstler, also overemphasized the merits and gave too little attention to the
prefiling inquiry.
2156
Petition for Rehearing, supra note 184 (Nakell's petition); Petition for Rehearing and
Suggestion for Rehearing in Banc submitted on Behalf of William Kunstler, Kunstler (No.
89-2815); Appellant Pitts' Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing in Banc,
Kunstler (No. 89-2815).
207
In re Kunstler, No. 89-2815, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 22983 (4th Cir. OcL 11, 1990);
Telephone Interview with Barry Nakell, appellant in Kunstler (Nov. 1, 1990); cf. Tobias,
supra note 31, at 144 (noting intracircuit Rule 11 variation and infrequency of en bane
hearings to foster consistency).
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one apparently so overburdened that Congress created four new
judgeships for it in the lOlst Congress. 2118
B.

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

In November 1990, Kunstler and Pitts filed separate petitions
for writs of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, and
Nakell did so in January 1991.2119 On April 15, 1991, the Supreme
Court denied the petitions, thus making the Fourth Circuit the
lawyers' "court of last resort. 11260 It appears unlikely, however, that
counsel would have received more solicitous treatment from the
Supreme Court. The Court has long expressed concern about the
litigation explosion and has demonstrated increasing willingness to
interpret procedural provisions in ways that frustrate attainment
of congressional goals, such as reducing discrimination, in substantive statutes-phenomena that the disastrous civil rights rulings of
the Court's 1988 Term exemplify. 261 The denial of certiorari
meant, of course, that the three attorneys had the difficult task of
persuading the very judge who imposed such large sanctions on
them that he should exercise his discretion to levy a much smaller

••• Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5098-99.
••• As to Kunstler and Pitts, see Kunstler v. Britt, 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1990);
Pitts v. Britt, 59 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1990); Pitts Petition, supra note 1; Kunstler
Petition, supra note 6. As to Nakell, see Nakell v. Britt, 59 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. Jan. 8,
1991); Nakell Petition, supra note 8. Julius Chanibers, who was sanctioned in Blue v.
United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), also decided to appeal the
Fourth Circuit decision. See Chanibers v. United States Dep't of Army, 59 U.S.L.W. 3503
(U.S. Jan. 8, 1991); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on Behalf of Julius Chambers, Chambers v. United States Dep't of Army, 59 U.S.L.W. 3503 (U.S. 1990) (No. 90-1076).
••• Kunstler v. Britt, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); Pitts v. Britt, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991); Nakell
v. Britt, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991). The Court also denied Julius Chanibers's petition in Blue.
Chanibers v. United States Dep't of Army, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). Of course, all of the
circuit courts have increasingly become courts of last resort because the Supreme Court
grants so few petitions for certiorari.
2 1
See Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, The Reagan Court and Title VII: A
•
Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1990) (discussing apparent
policies underlying recent Supreme Court Title VII cases and how decisions manifest these
policies through use of procedure); Symposium, The United States Supreme Court's 1988
Term Civil Rights Cases, 64 TuL. L. REV. 1341 (1990) (discussing Supreme Court's doctrines
and decisions on discrimination); Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amend·
ments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 993 (1991) (discussing use of amended
Rules 11, 16, and 26 in civil rights and discrimination cases) [hereinafter Tobias, Judicial
Discretion]; Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Problems, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 801 (1992)
(discussing Supreme Court cases of 1988 Term and Civil Rights Act of 1991, which modified
many of those cases) [hereinafter Tobias, Procedural Problems].

1992]

CIVIL RIGHTS CONUNDRUM

945

award. Given the lack of solicitude for the lavzyers that the judge
had already exhibited, his substantial discretion to choose the
sanction, and the Fourth Circuit's guidance, it was unlikely that
the district court would significantly reduce the assessment. 262
C.

DISTRICT COURT OPINION ON REMAND

On.August 30, 1991, the district court issued an opinion holding
Kunstler, Nakell and Pitts jointly and severally liable for $50,000
in sanctions. 263 The trial judge reiterated many of the instructions
that the Fourth Circuit afforded for ascertaining an appropriate
sanction; however, the district court failed to apply that guidance
meaningfully. The trial judge essentially imposed the sanctions for
compensatory purposes, generally seemed to misunderstand the
appellate court's directions, and specifically contravened several
explicit instructions.
The trial judge initially summarized the Fourth Circuit's guidance. The district court recognized that Rule ll's principal purpose is the deterrence of future litigation abuse and that a judge is
to impose the "least severe sanction adequate to serve the various
purposes of Rule 11. " 26' The district court then stated that other
purposes of Rule 11, such as reimbursing victims of Rule 11 violations, controlling dockets, and punishing violations, should be considered in ascertaining appropriate sanctions.26 1l The judge observed that when monetary sanctions are imposed, their amount
"should always reflect the primary purpose of deterrence. "266 The
trial court correspondingly stated that the Fourth Circuit required
it to consider explicitly four factors in selecting a pecuniary sanction: "(l) The reasonableness of the opposing party's attorney's
fees; (2) the minimum amount necessary to deter; (3) the ability to
pay; and (4) the severity of the Rule 11 violation. " 267 The judge

262
The Fourth Circuit's guidance, although potentially solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs,
remained general enough that it failed to cabin sufficiently the trial judge's considerable
discretion to select the sanction.
263
In re Kunstler, No. 89-06-CIV-3-H (E.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 1991) [hereinafter District
Court Opinion II].
2
. . Id. at 2 (citing In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 522 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1607 (1991)).
24
• Id. (citing Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 522).
266
Id. (quoting Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 523).
267
Id. (citing Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 523).
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added that monetary awards should be based upon these considerations and should not be premised exclusively on the amount of
attorney's fees that the movant has incurred. 268
The trial court recognized that a broad array of sanctions was
available and reiterated the idea that a judge must select the least
severe sanction necessary to achieve the Rule's deterrent purpose. 269 Nonetheless, the court determined that a monetary award
was appropriate as the "minimum sanction adequate to deter future Rule 11 violations,"270 offering little justification for that decision. The judge characterized counsel as experienced trial lawyers
who were "well versed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Rule 11" and who provide "legal services for public interest clients."271 The court also stated that the violation's character and
the attorneys' persistence in claiming that there was no Rule 11
violation required "more than a mere reprimand . . . to deter future violations. " 272 The judge, therefore, apparently premised his
decision to impose monetary sanctions on counsel's failure to be
sufficiently contrite. In short, the court a:fforded virtually no support for its determination to levy a financial award.
Once the district court found that monetary sanctions were appropriate, it purportedly applied the four factors articulated by the
Fourth Circuit. 273 Nevertheless, the trial judge apparently ignored
certain important facets of the appellate court's enunciation of
those considerations, while diffidently applying numerous other
aspects.
The district court, in evaluating the initial factor, the reasonableness of movant's attorney's fees, found that the fee requests
submitted were accurate and justified but determined that they
must be reduced by the amount spent in pursuing sanctions. 214
Thus, while the defendants sought $93,000 in sanctions, the trial
judge determined that the maximum amount that it could consider
Id. (citing Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 523).
Id. at 3-4.
210
Id. at 4.
211 Id.
212 Id.
273
See supra text accompanying note 267 (listing these factors).
274
District Court Opinion II, supra note 263, at 4-6; accord Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1387 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Blue v. United States Dep't of Army,
914 F.2d 525, 548 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Litigants should be able to defend themselves from
sanction without incurring additional sanctions."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991).
2
2

••

••
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reasonable as a :financial sanction was $59,000.2711 The district court
simply neglected to apply the Fourth Circuit's instructions that it
exclude from consideration in computing attorney's fees any time
that lawyers spent defending unsanctioned claims276 and that it reduce the fees awarded because of defendants' failure to give earlier
notice of potentially sanctionable conduct. 277 The trial judge apparently failed to apply the appellate court's guidance directing
him to consider whether the defendants neglected to mitigate their
expenditures by filing a Rule 11 motion only after dismissal,278 although the district court did mention this instruction.210
The trial judge then tersely examined the second factor, the
minimum amount necessary to deter. 280 The court rejected the
sanctioned attorneys' assertion that damage to their reputations
and public embarrassment were sufficient sanctions and accused
counsel of refusing to help it ascertain a monetary amount consistent with the Rule's deterrent purpose.281 The judge, accordingly,
premised the determination that a substantial pecuniary sanction
was necessary on his own analysis of the lawyers' behavior and
their reactions to the sanctions motion. 282 The court found that
"more than a nominal amount or 'token' award" was warranted to
guarantee that the attorneys would not file meritless litigation in
the future. 283 The district judge failed to make any individualized
determination of the least severe sanction necessary to deter.284
The court did not conduct this inquiry, even though Nakell
presented the court with a wealth of evidence that substantially
supported the imposition of a nonmonetary sanction or a significantly smaller financial award. 2811
District Court Opinion Il, supra note 263, at 4-6.
See id.; see also In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 523 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1607 (1991).
277
See District Court Opinion Il, supra note 263, at 4-6; see also Kunstler, 914 F.2d at
27

•

278

523.
278

See District Court Opinion II, supra note 263, at 4-6; see also Kunstler, 914 F.2d at

523.

District Court Opinion Il, supra note 263, at 5.
Id. at 6-7.
281
See id. at 7.
292 Id.
283
Id. at 6-7.
29
• Id.
29
• Nakell presented evidence, for example, of his reputation for honesty, ethical propriety, and public service and of the profound impact that the sanctions already imposed had
27

•

280
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The trial judge next considered the third factor, ability to pay. 286
Although Pitts had submitted much evidence relating to this consideration, the court summarily concluded that the magnitude of
the sanction selected was insufficiently large to bankrupt the attorneys or force them to quit practicing. 287 The judge apparently attempted to justify the cryptic treatment of ability to pay and the
lack of consideration that he accorded to each individual lawyer's
capacity. The court observed that the imposition of joint and several liability meant that Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts could formulate their own contribution system for paying the sanction, flippantly remarking that counsel clearly coordinated commencement
of the litigation that led to sanctioning and that they could pursue
a similar approach in paying the assessment. 288
The district court finally turned to the fourth factor, which comprises a miscellany of considerations that the Fourth Circuit articulated. 289 The judge examined only two of the considerations
and employed them essentially to substantiate the large amount of
the sanction levied. 29 ° First, the court derived the proposition that
counsel's violation of Rule 11 was intentional from the attorneys'
expertise as experienced trial lawyers. 291 Second, the judge stated
that the lawyers contravened all three parts of Rule 11, characterizing "[s]uch an extensive violation [as] egregious," and found that
their behavior amply supported a strong sanction. 292 The court,
however, failed to mention two critical considerations espoused by
the Fourth Circuit-the offender's history and the danger of chilling the kind of litigation implicated. 293 The application of these
considerations should have led the judge to levy a much smaller
sanction. For example, Nakell offered substantial evidence of his
exemplary record of legal representation, especially for resourcepoor individuals, such as Native Americans in Robeson County
had on him. Brief of Appellant Barry Nakell at 9-13, In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir.
1990) (No. 91-2267), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991) [hereinafter Brief of Nakell].
288
District Court Opinion II, supra note 263, at 7.
281 Id.
288 Id.
289
Id. at 7-8; see also Kunst/er, 914 F.2d at 524-25.
29
• District Court Opinion II, supra note 263, at 7-8.
291 Id.
292
Id.
293
See supra text accompanying note 290 (noting that judge considered only two of many
factors).
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and incarcerated persons.29' Correspondingly, when civil rights attorneys learn that their ablest colleagues, lawyers such as Julius
Chambers, William Kunstler, and Barry Nakell, have received
large sanctions, this chills the enthusiasm of all civil rights
practitioners.295
The court summarized its failure to accord individualized consideration to Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts by holding that all three
attorneys must be held jointly and severally liable.296 The judge
flatly refused to make any distinction among the lawyers, treating
them equally, because he considered their violations to be identical.297 The district court concluded its opinion by imposing joint
and several liability on Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts in the amount
of $50,000.298 The judge also prohibited all three attorneys from
appearing in or practicing before the Eastern District of North
Carolina until they paid the sanction. 299
D.

FOURTH CIRCUIT OPINION ON APPEAL OF RE!\L\ND

In October 1991, Kunstler, Nakell, and Pitts filed notices of appeal of the determination on remand to the trial court. 300 Briefing
occurred in early 1992, and oral argument was conducted on May
4, 1992.301 On July 2, the Fourth Circuit issued a per curiam, unpublished opinion in which it very deferentially reviewed the sanctions determination of the district judge.302
The panel initially dis.agreed with appellants' contention that
the imposition of nonmonetary sanctions would have satisfied Rule
ll's purposes.303 The court stated that the trial judge considered

Brief of Nakell, supra note 285, at 12·13.
See Blue v. United States Dep't of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 546·51 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming imposition of substantial sanction on Julius Chambers, Director-Counsel of NAACP
Legal Defense Fund), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991). See generally Stephen Labaton,
Solution to Wasteful Lawsuits Becomes a Problem, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, nt E2.
29
• District Court Opinion II, supra note 263, at 8.
291 Id.
29
• Id. at 9.
299
Id. This ruling meant that Nakell would have to pay the entire amount to practice in
the court, were Kunstler and Pitts not to contribute. Brief of Nakell, supra note 285, at 9
2

..

29

•

n.l.

Brief of Nakell, supra note 285, at 1.
Telephone Interview with Barry Nakell, Professor of Law, Unh·ersity of North Carolina (June 18, 1992).
0
• • In re Pitts, No. 91-2265, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 (4th Cir. July 2, 1992).
303
Id. at *3.
300
301
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nonfinancial sanctions but determined that the circumstances of
the lawsuit required that he levy a monetary award to deter future
abuse of the litigation process. 304 The Fourth Circuit observed that
such a decision was within the district judge's discretion and found
no abuse in the ruling. 3011
The panel then examined appellants' argument that the size of
the monetary sanctions imposed was excessive. The court reiterated the four factors that it had instructed the district judge to
take into account when ascertaining the amount of the assess. ment. 306 The Fourth Circuit traced tlie trial judge's calculations. 307
It stated that he began with $93,000 in fees and expenses that defendants claimed, reduced that by the amount spent on pursuit of
sanctions, and determined that the remaining fees and costs of
$59,000 were reasonable. 308 The panel stated that the district judge
imposed sanctions of $50,000 after considering the other three factors-"appellants' ability to pay, the minimum necessary to deter,
and the severity of the violation." 309
The Fourth Circuit essentially agreed with appellants' contention that the lack of itemization made it impossible to discern
whether expenses sought by defendants for time spent by SBI
agents and paralegals were devoted to pursuing Rule 11 sanctions. 310 The court expressed concern about the "lack of specificity" in affidavits substantiating these costs and disallowed them,
remarking that the trial judge might have had this generality in
mind when reducing the sanctions calculation from $59,000 to
$50,000. 311

The court decided that careful review of the briefs, the record,
and oral arguments revealed that the rest of appellants' challenges
lacked merit. 312 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district
judge acted within his discretion when levying sanctions but reduced the judgment to $43,325, subtracting the amount allowed for

30

'

0
• •

3o•
307
30s
300
310

011
312

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at *3-4.
at *4.
at *5.
at *5.
at *6.
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expenses of SBI agents and paralegals. 313
VII.

CmcuIT JURISPRUDENCE
CIVIL RIGHTS PLAINTIFFS AND LAWYERS
As troubling as the ruling in In re Kunstler is for civil rights
plaintiffs and attorneys, the opinion might be somewhat less problematic were it not part of broader developments in the Fourth
Circuit and nationwide. 314 The Supreme Court and many lower
federal courts have applied substantive and procedural provisions
of civil rights legislation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in ways that disadvantage, and even disproportionately affect, civil
rights plaintiffs and their counsel. 3111 These developments need not
be comprehensively chronicled here, for that task has been undertaken elsewhere. 316 Several examples, however, suffice to demonstrate that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.
In the 1988 Term, the Supreme Court interpreted substantive
and procedural language of numerous civil rights statutes in ways
that complicate the efforts of civil rights plaintiffs to vindicate
their rights. 317 The Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's finding that
a racial harassment claim was not cognizable under Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 316 one of the major civil rights cases of that
ADDITIONAL NATIONAL AND FOURTH

THAT DISADVANTAGES

.,. Id.
••• See generally Tobias, supra note 15; Tobias, Procedural Problems, supra note 261.
.,. See Tobias, supra note 15, at 296-335 (arguing that Federal Rules o.s applied adversely
affect civil rights plaintiffs); Phyllis T. Baumann, et al., Substance in the Shadow of Proc~
dure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L.
REv. 211 (1992) (arguing that procedures as applied adversely affect employment discrimination plaintiffs); Tobias, Procedural Problems, supra note 261, at 811-13 (analyzing Civil
Rights Act of 1991).
••• See, e.g., Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 261 (analyzing employment discrimination
cases of 1988 Term of Supreme Court); Tobias, supra note 15, at 296-335 (discussing judicial application of Rules 8, 11, 19, 24(a)(2), 68, and others and recognizing pattern of adverse application of these rules to civil rights plaintiffs); Overview: Civil Rights in the
1990s-Title VII and Employment Discrimination, 8 YALE L. & PoL'Y RE\•. 197, 197-379
(1990) (discussing in series of articles issues and policy choices in employment discrimination after 1988 Term).
017
See generally Tobias, Procedural Problems, supra note 261, at 811-13; Sandro Hemeryck et al., Comment, Reconstruction, Deconstruction and Legislative Reponse: The 1988
Supreme Court Term and the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 475
(1990) (recounting history of civil rights legislation and Supreme Court. enforcement thereof
and examining legislative responses to Court's decisions).
318
491 U.S. 164, 178 (1989), aff'g in part, vacating in part, and remanding 805 F.2d 1143
(4th Cir. 1986).
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Term. All of the circuits, including the Fourth Circuit, now demand that the plaintiffs plead with particularity under Rule 8. 319
Typical of the circuit's jurisprudence is a recent determination
that affirmed a lower court's decision to read Rule 68 in conjunction with the fee-shifting provision of Title VII in a manner that
severely restricts plaintiffs' ability to recover fees, thus potentially
limiting the number of attorneys who are willing to take civil rights
cases. 320
VIII. IMPLICATIONS OF IN RE KUNSTLER
The Fourth Circuit litigation involving Rule 11 could have many
deleterious consequences. For the Native American and African
American residents of Robeson County who have little political
power and few economic resources, it represents the loss of one
important opportunity to increase their strength in a community
where they have experienced discrimination and to limit alleged
corruption among local officials. Insofar as these individuals, and
others similarly situated, rely on federal civil rights litigation to
reduce discrimination and to enhance their political, economic, and
social opportunities, both courts' unsolicitous treatment of the parties and their lawyers in In re Kunstler discourages them. The
Fourth Circuit and the district court have correspondingly compromised the exercise of fundamental First Amendment rights of free
speech and freedom of association and assembly and perhaps permitted the chilling of a legitimate form of protest in Robeson
County.
••• See, e.g., Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 30 & n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing authority
from all circuits), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); Wetherington v. Phillips, 526 F.2d 591
(4th Cir. 1975); cf. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination,
954 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 2989 (1992) (indication that Supreme
Court may resolve issue). See generally Tobias, supra note 15, at 296-301 (discussing federal
judicial application of Rule 8 in public law litigation). For analysis of the application of
numerous additional Rules, see id. at 301-35 (discussing Rules 11, 68, 19, and 24(a)(2)).
20
•
Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 662-64 (4th Cir. 1990). Rule 68 governs
settlement offers. The Rule states, "If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not
more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of
the offer." FED. R. C1v. P. 68. Spencer purports to follow Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985),
which interpreted Rule 68 governing settlement offers in conjunction with the Civil Rights
Attorneys Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). See generally Thomas P. Rowe, Jr. &
Neil Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement: A Preliminary Report, 51 LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROBS. 13 (Autumn 1988) (reporting on study results of offers to settle in civil
litigation).
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The trial judge's vigorous application of Rule 11 and the appellate court's failure to scrutinize such enforcement may effectively
mean that the pursuit of civil rights cases in certain federal district
courts has for all practical purposes been foreclosed. 321 The panel's
lack of concern for vindication of essential First and Sixth Amendment rights as well as statutory civil rights is disheartening, because the Fourth Circuit is, in nearly all cases, the court of last
resort in a region that has a long, troubled history of denying political and economic power to racial minorities. 322 The threat that
some district judges, who are unsympathetic and even hostile to
civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys, will zealously enforce Rule 11
and that circuit courts will deferentially review such application, in
conjunction with other detrimental developments, such as the Supreme Court's civil rights opinions of the 1988 Term, will additionally diminish the already small pool of lawyers who are willing to

321
The Kunstler and Blue litigation could discourage potential civil rights plaintiffs and
counsel who might represent them from pursuing litigation in the Eastern District or North
Carolina. Data assembled in five federal districts having computerized dockets show that
civil rights plaintiffs are more likely to be sanctioned than litigants who pursue a number or
other types of cases. See FJC REPORT, supra note 34, § lC (summarizing Rule 11 sanctions
in civil rights cases from five federal district courts).
322
Much school desegregation and voting rights litigation arose out or the Fourth Circuit.
For example, the Supreme Court consolidated cases from the Eastern District or South Carolina and the Eastern District of Virginia with Brown v. Board or Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). One of the leading voting rights cases held Virginia's poll tax unconstitutional.
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The trial court had upheld
the use of the poll tax as a prerequisite to voting in state and local elections. Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 240 F. Supp. 270, 271 (E.D. Va. 1964), reu'd, 383 U.S. 663
(1966). In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Virginia Supreme Court case of Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966),
reu'd, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which had upheld a conviction tmder a state statute prohibiting
- interracial marriages between Whites and African Americans. Id. at 82. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Supreme Court struck down the application or Virginia laws,
which defined as malpractice the actions of attorneys who joined suits without having a
personal stake, such as the NAACP joining in racial discrimination suits. In Button, the
Court reversed the Virginia Supreme Court case of NAACP v. Harrison, 116 S.E.2d 55 (Va.
1960), reu'd sub nom. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The Virginia court had affirmed in part and reversed in part a declaratory judgment against the NAACP. The Virginia court had held that a state statute that provided for disbarment of attorneys who
accepted employment from an organization acting as agent for another person, but which
itself had no pecuniary right or liability, was constitutional. Id. at 64-69. The Virginia Court
also had struck down a statute that made it unlawful for any person not having a direct
interest in the suit to offer money or anything of value to another to induce that person to
commence a suit. Id. at 69-72.
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pursue civil rights cases aggressively.~23 Moreover, these problems
could sharply curtail the representation of unpopular persons or
causes as well as the filing and vigorous pursuit of highly political
or controversial lawsuits, such as those seeking to challenge the
questionable exercise of governmental authority.
The Kunstler case has serious professional and personal consequences for attorneys like Barry Nakell and Lewis Pitts, who take
on these types of cases, causes, and clients in an effort to improve
the quality of justice for all citizens. It is difficult to estimate the
impact in the legal community and the broader society of having
the appeals court besmirch one's reputation and impugn one's integrity in the pages of the Federal Reporter. This treatment ignores the enormous monetary, temporal, and emotional expenditures that these two attorneys and William Kunstler have devoted
to defending their reputations and their resources. Even if the entire monetary sanction had been removed, Nakell might have
ceased pursuing cases like Bounds v. Smith, 324 which convinced the
Supreme Court to create new rights for incarcerated individuals,
who are the least powerful members of society. Perhaps Nakell will
quit the practice altogether, a course of action that Rule 11 has
forced some lawyers to consider and a few to follow. 3211

323

For a discussion of developments that have additionally diminished the small pool of
civil rights attorneys, see Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 743-59 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. l, 15-32 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For discussion of
the Reagan Administration's federal judicial appointments and their lack of solicitude for
civil rights plaintiffs, see Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Future of Liberal
Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REV. 189, 191-98 (1988). Cf. Carl Tobias, More Women
Named Federal Judges, 43 FLA. L..REV. 477, 480 (1991) (expressing similar ideas regarding
Bush Administration appointees); Tobias, Procedural Problems, supra note 261, at 811-13
(noting that Congress passed Civil Rights Act of 1991 after bitter fight, but legislation did
not treat numerous procedural obstacles that civil rights plaintiffs confront).
32
• 430 U.S. 817 (1977). Bounds reaffirmed the requirement that prison officials provide
prisoners with law libraries and legal assistance. Id.
3
•• See Labaton, supra note 295, at E2 (noting that some lawyers left practice because of
Rule 11 sanctions); George Cochran, Professor of Law, University of Mississippi, and
Charles Presto, Esq., Atlanta, Ga., Statements at New York University Rule 11 Conference
(Nov. 2-3, 1990) (same); cf. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 524 (4th Cir. 1990) ("A court
should refrain from imposing a monetary award so great that it will bankrupt the offending
parties or force them from the future practice of law."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1607 (1991);
see also supra text accompanying note 245 (discussing Kunstler court's assertion that district judges should refrain from levying sanctions that would drive attorneys out of
practice).
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11

As disadvantageous as In re Kunstler could be for the vindication of civil rights in the Fourth Circuit and nationally, the litigation will have served a valuable purpose if it persuades those responsible for changing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
fundamental revision of Rule 11 must now be seriously considered.
On November 1, 1990, the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules
received written public comments on Rule ll's operation. An overwhelming number of those comments criticized the Rule, and
many who commented called for its repeal or substantial
amendment. 326
Numerous witnesses offered similar observations at a February
1991 public hearing held in New Orleans. 327 That testimony and
the preliminary :findings of a Federal Judicial Center study of Rule
11, which the Advisory Committee commissioned, apparently
prompted the Committee to conclude that some revision was warranted. 326 Most Committee members seemed to believe that additional amendment was necessary, while a few apparently considered the perception that Rule 11 was chilling litigants and lawyers
to be sufficient justification.329 The Judicial Center's tentative determinations that civil rights plaintiffs were more likely than certain other litigants to be sanctioned in numerous federal districts
led the Advisory Committee to ask for refinement of the data. 330
32
• Telephone Interview with Thomas Willging, Deputy Research Director, Federal Judicial Center (Nov. 15, 1990). This also is my assessment after reviewing many of the comments submitted.
327
Telephone Interview with Thomas Willging, Deputy Research Director, Federal Judicial Center (Feb. 26, 1991); Telephone Interview with Melissa Nelken, Professor, Hastings
College of the Law (Feb. 26, 1991); Telephone Interview with Georgene Vairo, Professor,
Fordham University School of Law (Feb. 26, 1991). Professors Nelken and Vairo testified at
the February hearing.
328
See supra note 327 and accompanying text (discussing testimony); FED&RAL JUDICIAL
CENTER. PRELIMINARY REPORT ON RULE 11 (Feb. 27, 1991) [hereinafter PRELJMINARY REPORT]. The Judicial Center also found that approximately 803 or the federal district judges
favor retaining Rule 11 intact, even though a similar number believe that the Rule does not
prevent litigation abuse. Moreover, monetary assessments remain the "sanction of choice"
for violations of Rule 11. See Executive Summary in PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra.
2
• • These ideas are gleaned from the telephone conversations, supra note 327, and from
what the Committee members actually said about possible revision at the oral hearing.
330
See supra note 321 (citing Judicial Center data); telephone interviews, supra note 327
(noting Committee request that data be refined); cf. Marshall, et al., supra note 38, at 96573 (noting that civil rights plaintiffs are more likely to be sanctioned than nearly all other
litigants).
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At the regularly-scheduled Advisory Committee meeting, which
was held in late May of 1991, the Committee proposed revisions in
Rule 11 that were circulated for public comment in August 1991.331
One significant change was the Committee's imposition of a "continuing duty," which would require lawyers and prose litigants to
withdraw almost any portion of a paper when it becomes untenable. 332 The Committee also prescribed "safe harbors," which would
require that parties provide alleged violators notice and opportunity to withdraw deficient claims before the parties file Rule 11
motions. 333 The proposed Advisory Committee note that would accompany the proposed Rule also affords judges increased flexibility
in punish.ing violations, admonishing them to reduce the use of attorney's fees as sanctions. 334 Public comment on the proposal,
which was due in February 1992, was nearly as critical as that submitted in November 1990.3311
In mid-June 1992, the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee) approved many
of the recommendations that the Advisory Committee had forwarded and included several significant changes of its own. 336 The
most important modification that the Standing Committee made
was the suggested reversion to the discretionary imposition of
sanctions once Rule violations have been found. 337 The Committee

331
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 74-82 (1991)
[hereinafter FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (Proposed Draft)]. See generally Carl Tobias, Reconsidering
Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855 (1992) (analyzing Rule 11 proposal).
332
FED. R. C1v. P. ll(b) (Proposed Draft), supra note 331, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. at 75.
See generally Tobias, supra note 331, at 866-70.
333
FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c)(l)(A) (Proposed Draft), supra note 331, reprinted in 137 F.R.D.
at 76. See generally Tobias, supra note 331, at 875-79.
334
See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 (Proposed Draft), supra note 331, advisory committee's note,
reprinted in 137 F.R.D. at 78-80. See generally Tobias, supra note 331, at 880-87.
3
•• This conclusion is premised on my review of numerous comments and discussions with
a number of commentators. See also supra note 330 and accompanying text (addressing
November comment).
336
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 43 (July 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter PROPOSAL].
The Advisory Committee made numerous changes in its May 1991 draft before sending it to
the Supreme Court. See Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of
Rule 11, 77 lowA L. REV. (forthcoming 1992).
337
See PROPOSAL, supra note 336, at 46 (Proposed FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c)) ("[T]he court
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correspondingly agreed to include in the committee note the ideas
that monetary sanctions "should ordinarily be paid into court as a
penalty" and should be paid to those injured by violations only in
"unusual circumstances."338 The Committee also decided to limit
the continuing-duty concept. 339
In September, the Judicial Conference approved the proposal
that the Standing Committee tendered and submitted the proposal
to the Supreme Court. 340 The Court in turn must forward its recommendation to Congress before May 1, 1993, and that proposal
will become effective 210 days thereafter, unless Congress alters
it.341
In re Kunstler vividly demonstrates the advisability of the type
of amendment now under consideration. The case and other Rule
11 litigation illustrate that the Supreme Court and Congress
should repeal or revise the provision expeditiously. If the Supreme
Court does not make additional changes solicitous of civil rights
plaintiffs, Congress may want to intercede, if only to prevent additional erosion of the substantive civil rights legislation that it has
passed. 342 Without additional amendment of Rule 11, its enforcement could continue to discourage individuals and attorneys who
pursue civil rights cases in objective good faith.
CONCLUSION

The Judicial Conference's recent indication that it will propose

may . . . impose an appropriate sanction ...•" (emphasis added)); see also Randall
Samborn, Key Panel Votes Shift in Rule II, NAT'L L.J., July 6, 1992, at 13 (discussing this
proposal). The pre-1983 version of Rule 11 was discretionary. FED. R. CIV. P. 11, reprinted in
97 F.R.D. 196, 197 (1983).
338
Proposed FED. R. CIV. P. 11 proposed advisory committee note, PROPOSAL, supra note
336, at 53-54; see also supra text accompanying note 334.
33
• See Proposed FED. R. C1v. P. ll(b), PROPOSAL, supra note 336, at 45; see also Proposed
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 proposed advisory committee note, PROPOSAL, supra note 336, at 53·54.
0
•• Marianne Lavell, The Judicial Conference Would Alter Rule 11, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 5,
1992, at 5. See generally Lewis, supra note 20 (discussing rules revision process); Mullenix,
supra note 134 (same).
30
Samborn, supra note 337; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (Supp. 1992) (requiring submission of proposed rule to Congress and establishing effective date). Each entity in the rule
revision hierarchy typically evinces increasing deference to the judgment of those below iL
... See Tobias, supra note 336, § ill (suggesting additional refinement. in Rule 11 proposal); see also Tobias, Judicial Discretion, supra note 261, at 961 (discussing general congressional reluctance to intercede in rule revision); supra note 323 (discussing judicial and legislative failure to treat procedural problems in civil rights cases).
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rev1s1on of Rule 11 affords considerable promise of change for
those civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers who have been the victims
of nearly nine years of experimentation with Rule 11. Repeal or
substantial amendment will help parties and attorneys who seek to
reduce discrimination by vindicating rights in the federal courts.
Revision of Rule 11 would be an ·advance, albeit a modest one, especially for Native Americans and African Americans like residents
of Robeson County who band together to combat discrimination,
poverty, and alleged official misconduct.
More than four years after Eddie Hatcher and Timothy Jacobs
broke into The Robesonian,343 and nearly three years after both
men completely paid any debt that they owed society, there has
been little change in Robeson County. 344 Numerous Native-American and African-American residents of Robeson County still are
attempting to exercise their First Amendment rights and to attain
a measure of political and economic power, even as many continue
to encounter discrimination and governmental intimidation. Allegations of official misconduct remain rampant, while there is apparently considerable drug trafficking.
As Barry Nakell prepares for another semester of teaching law
students about the justice system, he must confront the unhappy
prospect of knowing that he will never be completely vindicated.
Perhaps Nakell will discontinue his quiet, but forceful, work to
achieve social justice for all North Carolinians. William Kunstler
has defiantly proclaimed: "I'm not going to pay any fine . . . . I'm
going to rot in jail if that's what I have to do to dramatize this
thing." 3411 The ultimate irony, of course, is that years after the
events that led to the Rule 11 proceeding, and even some time after the Rule is ultimately revised, certain litigants and lawyers,
who seek to vindicate fundamental constitutional and civil rights,
will continue to experience the chilling effects of the 1983 amendment to Rule 11.

343
See supra text accompanying note 6 (describing this event).
••• See supra text accompanying notes 78, 80 (describing termination of Jacobs's criminal
suit and of civil litigation on behalf of Hatcher and Jacobs).
••• Don J. DeBenedictis, Rule 11 Snags Lawyers, 77 AB.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 16, 17.

